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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the paradoxical politics of jury trials in Kazakhstan. In doing so, it 
tries to find out the influence of jury institution on the pro-accusation bias within criminal 
justice system as well as reasons for institutional resistance against the expansion of jury 
trials and the ways this resistance takes form. More broadly, this research is directed 
towards understanding the state-society relations in non-democratic regimes, dynamics of 
criminal justice reforms, conflict and cooperation within criminal justice system, 
interaction between law-enforcement officials and laypersons, legal consciousness of 
jurors. Generally, this study finds out that jury trials do reduce the accusation bias; 
however this impact is almost invisible due to limited jurisdiction of jury institution. 
Whereas legal actors such as prosecutors and judges resist against the expansion of jury 
trials in the state, since jurors expose the weaknesses of provided evidences by 
prosecution side during trials as well as diminish the power of the judge of solely 
determining the verdicts. Also, this research demonstrates that jurors help to discipline 
judges and prosecutors. Most importantly, jurors can and actually do decide serious 
criminal cases, they are intolerant towards being controlled by judges and they are against 
the harsh criminal punishments for certain crimes. On top of that, jurors are not restricted 
within the framework of the criminal charges proposed by prosecutor; they can and 
actually do change the qualification of alleged crimes toward less severe ones, which 
consequently lessen punishment.  
Key words: jury trials, accusation bias, institutional resistance 
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Chapter 1. Jury Trials in Kazakhstan: Effective yet Unknown, 
Promoted yet Resisted 
Paradox: Jury Trials in Non-Democracies 
 
In May 2015, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed the 
national program of “100 concrete steps” to implement five institutional reforms: 
“Creation of a modern and professional civil service, ensuring the rule of law, 
industrialization and economic growth, a unified nation for the future, transparency and 
accountability of the state” (akorda.kz 2015) As it generally recognized “plan of the 
nation” is supposed to eliminate the systemic problems within the state and enable 
Kazakhstan to enter the list of 30 most competitive countries in the world (Idrissov 
2015). Curiously, President specifically mentioned the need for expanding the use of the 
jury trials to improve the judicial system in Kazakhstan in order to ensure the rule of law. 
This is an urgent problem because Kazakhstan’s rule of law-rankings are low, as 
documented by the Freedom House and World Justice Project. He declared in the 21st 
step: “More use of jury service in trials. An implementation of a legal definition of 
categories of criminal cases, where a jury trial must be mandatory” (akorda.kz 
2015). Unlike many vague statements, here it is clear that President believes that jury 
trials are more fair and impartial than judge-only trials in deciding criminal cases and 
wants some trials to be conducted by juries consisting of laypersons. Thus, he promotes 
the expansion of jury trials, which have been functioning in Kazakhstan since 2007 and 
decided almost 1,400 serious criminal cases.  
Yet jury trials remain a virtually unknown criminal justice institution even 
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though the public tends to trust them more than to professional judges, according to 
public opinion surveys (Sidorov 2015). The sociological survey conducted by 
Association of Sociologists and Political Scientists of Kazakhstan in all regional centers 
of the country in 2005 indicated that 51,1% out of 2336 respondents supported the 
introduction of jury trials in the Kazakhstan, while 21,9% of persons were against its 
functioning and 27% refrain from providing the answer (Suleimenova 2009). According 
to Izbassarov (2017) the majority of Kazakhstani citizens have positive attitude toward 
the jury trials (63% out of 765 respondents). About half of the respondents (52% out of 
765 respondents) expressed their trust toward the jury institution. So, in general 
investigations both prior to the introduction of the jury trials in 2007 and after its ten 
years’ experience demonstrate the public support to this institution. 
Almost two years passed since the President’s call for jury trials to be expanded, 
but the rest of the state apparatus failed to expand the jury trials to the appropriate level. 
The 2016 Criminal Procedure Code amendments have not made jury trials mandatory for 
any category of crimes. Instead, they expanded the category of cases eligible to be tried 
by jury to crimes related with the recruitment of minors into criminal activities, 
kidnapping, trafficking of minors – committed by organized group of people that lead to 
the death or severe consequence (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 2015 “O 
vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v nekotorye zakonodatelnye akty Respubliki Kazakhstan 
po voprosam soversenstvovaniia sistemy otpravleniia pravosudiia”). But, according to 
official statistics, these criminal cases are rarely registered and even rarer reach the 
courts. This has been a fake expansion. It takes place because many state prosecutors, 
investigators and judges resist against the real expansion of jury trials. So the paradox 
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emerges: Why and how in the system with popular President, do officials whom he 
appoints, resist against his commands? They resist because jury trials are effective: they 
weaken the accusation bias. Law-enforcement apparatus resists collectively, since there is 
a well-established informal relationship between all professionals in criminal 
proceedings, including the defense counsel. In other words, detectives and investigators 
do not put much effort in collecting strong evidence, because they know that prosecutors 
will approve the case anyway. Prosecutors than informally negotiate with judges, that the 
latter will approve most or all criminal charges and convict defendants or at least not 
acquit. However, when the jurors – ordinary people – enter criminal proceedings and 
really decide cases, they pose a threat to all informal bargains made among detectives, 
investigators, prosecutors, and judges. As I will show below, this threat is real: jury trials 
strengthen adversarial procedure while jurors both debureaucratize and break cozy 
informal relationships within the criminal justice institutions and produce fairer 
outcomes. Jury trials acquit much more often than single-judge trials. And the criminal 
justice institutions resist jury trials in various ways: through shaping the negative public 
image of jury trials, lobbying for the restriction of their jurisdiction, manipulating the 
actual jury trial proceedings and overturning the acquittal verdicts.  
The similar dynamics have occurred in Russia, where jury trials began 
functioning in several provinces in 1994 and expanded to the whole country in 2002 – 
one jury trial court per province. Their jurisdiction was narrowed in 2008, yet President 
Putin has recently ordered the expansion of territorial application of trials (RAPSI News 
2016). According to the new law, beginning from the 1 January of 2018 the jury trials 
would be additionally conducted in all 2,500 district courts (raionnye sudy) and military 
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courts (voenno-garnizonnnye sudy) (Law of the Russian Federation of 2016 “O vnesenii 
izmenenii v ugolovno-processualnyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii v sviazi s rasshireniem 
primeneniia instituta prisiazhnykh zasedatelei”). Although this regulation does not 
expand the category of cases available for juries, it makes trials more accessible for all 
the parties including jurors, defendants, victims, witnesses and others. Since earlier vast 
Russian territories often times required all these parties travel long distances in order to 
attend court trials. So, after analyzing the cases of Kazakhstan and Russia it is interesting 
to note how these states constantly change their policies regarding jury institution. Why 
do we observe these back-and-forth approaches to jury trials in non-democracies? 
Learning about the paradoxical politics of jury trials in Kazakhstan opens a 
unique window for understanding the state-society relations in non-democratic regimes: 
dynamics of criminal justice reforms; conflict and cooperation within the criminal justice 
system; interaction between law-enforcement officials and laypersons (defendants, 
victims, and jurors); and legal consciousness of jurors – ordinary persons who are asked 
to decide serious criminal cases. 
Empirical and Theoretical Research Questions 
 
The purpose of my thesis is to investigate the politics behind the resistance of law 
enforcement criminal justice system against the President’s proposal of expanding jury 
trials and making them mandatory. I argue that the core reason for the resistance could be 
the risks that jury trials pose to informal relationships and the accusation bias within the 
criminal justice system. . My empirical research questions are:  
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• “Do jury trials reduce the accusation bias in criminal proceedings 
Kazakhstan? How and Why?” 
Jury trial courts have decided almost 1,400 criminal cases in the first decade of their 
operation in Kazakhstan. This provides me with sufficient number of data points for 
systematic analysis of the outcomes of these cases.  
My theoretical questions are: 
• How and why does the involvement of ordinary people in criminal 
proceedings change criminal justice in non-democratic regimes? 
• Why would these regimes, which rely heavily on coercive law enforcement, 
want ordinary people deciding serious criminal cases more fairly? 
Addressing these big questions contributes to the growing body of political science 
research on the interplay between law and politics in non-democratic regimes, 
criminological research on the punitiveness of criminal proceedings, socio-legal studies 
of lay participation in the legal system and democratization literature on making 
democratically responsible citizens-decision-makers. 
Concepts: Mixed Jury Trials, Informality, and Varieties of Resistance 
 
There are several important concepts that arise in my thesis: 
Mixed jury trials – in Kazakhstan it is a mixed court trial, where 10 lay assessors 
along with a single professional judge jointly determine the verdict and have the authority 
to change criminal charges. Any verdict of jury trial can be appealed indefinite number of 
times. 
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Accusation bias/Conviction bias/Pro-accusation bias– in Kazakhstani criminal 
practices as well as in other post-soviet states there is a systematic informal tendency of 
trial judges to show leniency towards prosecutors, to convict defendants much more than 
50% of the time and of appellate judges to overturn acquittals much more often than 
convictions. This phenomenon is explained by various formal regulations and informal 
norms within judicial system.  
Acquittal rate – is the percentage of criminal cases, where defendants have been 
cleared up of all allegations. It could be also measured by the proportion of acquitted and 
exonerated persons among all tried persons. I use the acquittal rate in criminal cases of 
public prosecution – in which state prosecutor is present - as an indicator of bias. 
Decision-making – the processes of determining the verdict and changing the 
criminal charges - exercising the core responsibility of jurors and judge during the jury 
trials and of professional judges during judge-only trials and appellate hearings. 
Informal relation between the prosecutors and judges – it is “unofficial” 
relationship between two law institutions, where prosecutors negotiate in advance with 
trial and/or appellate judges about the outcome of criminal case. Prosecution influences 
judges through the threats to appeal unfavorable sentence. Bribes offered by the 
defendants may also influence this informal relationship. 
Resistance through lobbying – it is the refusal of law-enforcement agencies such 
as General Prosecution Office, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior and Supreme 
Court to implement the President’s jury-expanding proposals in full, proposing jury-
reducing bills and engaging in fake expansion of jury trials.  
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Active resistance – formal and informal practices by law-enforcement officials of 
manipulating the jury trials, spreading negative messages about jury trials in the media, 
cancelling the jury-made acquittals, and persuading defendants not to ask for a jury trial. 
Passive resistance – formal and informal practices by officials of ignoring citizens 
not showing up for jury duty and not informing defendants about their right to jury 
Hypotheses: Effects of Jury Trials and Resistance against Them 
 
I develop six hypotheses explaining how and why jury trials actually make a 
difference (Hypotheses 1-3) in reducing accusation bias in Kazakhstan, and how and why 
the rest of the state apparatus resist jury trials (Hypotheses 4-6).  
 
H1: The adversarial procedure of jury trials reduces the accusation bias 
Criminal proceedings in the jury trial courts are more adversarial than in single-judge 
trials in Kazakhstan because: 
• Ability of defense counsel to criticize evidences provided by prosecutors is 
stronger than in single-judge trials; 
• Ability of defense counsel to persuade jurors is stronger than in single-judge 
trials; 
• Adversarial proceedings provide incentives for the defense counsel to work harder 
than in single-judge trials.  
 
H2: The jurors’ attitude toward decision-making reduces the accusation bias 
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Jurors are outsiders to the law-enforcement system. They are different from criminal 
justice bureaucrats - police detectives, judges and prosecutors - in their decision-making: 
• Jurors’ attitudes and values are different from those of detectives, judges and 
prosecutors; 
• Jurors feel more responsible for the outcome of the case and fate of the tried 
person(s) than professional law-enforcement officials feel. 
 
H3: Jurors reduce accusation bias by breaking informal bargaining between Judges 
and Prosecutors 
Jurors may expose that prosecutors and judges negotiate the outcome of the case or 
make these negotiations less effective: 
• Jurors are “outsiders”, they are not part of the informal criminal justice “system”; 
• Jurors are difficult to bribe, because there are 10 of them;  
• Jurors may reveal to the public any information about improper relations 
(corruption, pressure, and/or improper interference) between judges and 
prosecutors. 
The following set of hypotheses examine the ways in which most law-enforcement 
actors resist against jury trials in various ways on several fronts: shaping public opinion, 
lobbying at the top level and manipulating at the trial level.  
 
H4: Criminal justice professionals (e.g. detectives, investigators, prosecutors and 
judges) resist by portraying jurors to the public as unprofessional and emotional 
individuals unable to assess evidences and deliver fair verdicts 
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H5: Criminal justice professionals resist to the expansion of jury trials by blocking 
the expansion of the jury trials or by faking it. 
 
H6: Criminal justice professionals resist through the manipulation of jury trial 
process (e.g. biased selection of jurors, restricting the rights of defendant to have a 
jury trial, falsifying the list of questions given to the jurors before deliberation, etc.) 
 
Drawing on my field research, I examine how jury trials reduce accusation bias in 
Chapter 4. While, Chapter 5 provides analysis of resistance against them in Kazakhstan.  
Research Design and Methodology  
 
Studying decision-making of jurors and judges is difficult because their 
deliberations are secret, they take place in a special room in the courthouse, and their 
contents are forbidden to disclose. Moreover, jury trials take place rarely due to the 
aforementioned resistance (more on this see below). Finally, learning about informal 
relations between detective, investigators, prosecutors and judges for me as an outsider to 
the criminal justice world was also going to be a challenge. Therefore, I chose to 
triangulate my data sources to collect both direct and indirect evidence of accusation bias, 
trials and judgments, informal relationships and resistance against jury trials – all in order 
to maximize the number of observations and have variation on these key dependent 
variables. This is consistent with what King, Keohane and Verba (1995: 212) recommend 
in their textbook: The primary way of maximizing the leverage over the research 
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problems is to find as many observable implications of your theory as possible and to 
make observations of those implications.  
In order to find the evidence that would support or falsify my hypotheses I used 
several data collection strategies. To begin with, I conducted semi-structured in-depth 
interviews that lasted around 45-60 minutes each, with all actors engaged in the actual 
jury trials. This was important for objectivity because I needed to learn from my 
purposive sample the points of view from all sides of criminal proceedings. Securing 
interviews with state officials was a challenge. I interviewed 5 judges from the 
Specialized Interdistrict court for criminal cases of Astana - the only trial-level court with 
the jury trials in the city, 6 prosecutors from Astana city’s three districts: Sary-Arka 
district Prosecution office, Esyl district Prosecution office, and Almaty district 
Prosecution office. In contrast, interviewing attorneys was easier. I interviewed 6 
attorneys who represented both the victim and the defendant in jury trials. I also chose to 
interview 3 attorneys, who have not taken part in jury trials, in order to learn valuable 
information regarding single-judge trials and formal and informal practices within 
Kazakhstani criminal justice system.  
 
This is the list of interviewed attorneys – participants in the actual jury trials: 
Attorneys from Astana city collegium of advocates: 
1. Telman Alenov is the former prosecutor has participated in several trials as 
prosecutor and later as the advocate. He was a prosecutor in 3 criminal cases 
regarding drug trafficking, 1 criminal case regarding corruption and 1 case 
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regarding murder; also he was defense attorney in 2 criminal cases regarding 
murder.  
2. Al’mira Shaikhina she has been defense attorney in 1 criminal case regarding 
murder and 1 criminal case regarding corruption. 
 
Advocates from the Karagandy city collegium of advocates:  
3. Nenakhova Yelena - she has been defense attorney in 2 criminal cases regarding 
drug trafficking.  
4. Meiram Zharylgapov - he has been defense attorney in 3 criminal cases regarding 
drug trafficking and 2 criminal cases regarding the murder. 
 
Advocates from the Almaty city collegium of advocates: 
5. Iskander Alimbayev - he has been defense attorney in 1 criminal case regarding 
extortion. 
6. Raziya Nurmasheva - she has been defense attorney in 4 criminal cases regarding 
the murder and 1 criminal case regarding extortion. 
 
Advocates who did not participated in jury trials: 
7. Jokhar Utebekov is the advocate from Almaty collegium of advocates and popular 
Internet blogger. 
8. Amanzhol Mukhamedyarov is the advocate from Astana collegium of advocates. 
9. Asele Elchubayeva is the advocate from Astana collegium of advocates. 
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Moreover, I participated in the training seminar for advocates “Strategies in jury 
trials”, which took place on 3 February, 2017 in Astana. The seminar was organized by 
the Almaty-based think-tank Legal Policy Research Center (LPRC) and sponsored by the 
UK Embassy in Kazakhstan. About 40 attorneys from Astana, West Kazakhstan, Aktobe, 
North Kazakhstan and Karagandy provinces attended this seminar and learned defense 
strategies in the jury trials. The training session was lead by Mr. Nick Stanage who is the 
barrister at Doughty street chambers, UK and who has the 16 years of experience of 
participation in jury trials. At this seminar, I was able to talk to several attorneys and 
learn about their reactions towards jury trials. 
But the most difficult task was to find jurors and to gain information from them. For 
obvious reasons, surveying jurors is not option in Kazakhstan in contrast to Kalven and 
Zaisel (1966) who conducted a pioneering survey of juror perceptions in the USA – the 
technique that has been consequently cited and replicated by many scholars. I managed to 
interview 7 jurors who have directly participated in the trials. Due to ethical 
considerations I do not reveal their names and places. Instead, I mention the details of 
criminal cases, which they had decided, to show the seriousness of accusations, and 
variation over time and in types of crime, and the outcomes of jury trials.   
Juror 1 participated in the trial in 2016 in the case regarding murder and violent acts 
of sexual nature, where 3 defendants have been found guilty and convicted to 19, 16 and 
14 years of imprisonment.  
Juror 2 participated in the trial in 2017 in the case regarding the murder, where the 
defendant had been found guilty in the different crime that is the murder committed in the 
state of affection and was convicted to 3 years and 6 months of imprisonment. 
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Juror 3 participated in the trial in 2012 in the criminal case regarding the drug 
trafficking, where the defendant had been found guilty and convicted to 11 years of 
imprisonment. 
Juror 4 participated in the trial in 2013 in the criminal case regarding drug trafficking, 
where the defendant had been acquitted. 
Juror 5 participated in the trial in the 2014 in the criminal case regarding murder 
where the defendant had been found guilty and convicted to 17 years of imprisonment. 
Juror 6 and Juror 7 have participated in the same trial in the 2015 in the criminal case 
regarding the planned murder attempt, where 3 defendants had been convicted to 14, 13 
and 12 years of imprisonment respectively. 
To the best of my knowledge, not a single social science researcher has interviewed 
jurors in Kazakhstan before. These interviews helped me to get a sense of pro-accusation 
bias, decision-making of juries, informal relations among law-enforcement institutions, 
influence of judges on the juries, and legal consciousness of jurors. One of the main 
limitations of interviews with jurors was the sample size; it may seem that the 
experiences of 7 jurors are not enough to draw a theory about the Kazakhstani practices 
of jury trials. However, taking into consideration the rareness of jury trials in Kazakhstan 
– merely 47 jury trials have been held in 2016 – and difficulties in the finding 
information about particular jurors not to mention difficulties in approaching them, the 
experience of 7 jurors supported by other sources of data may be the first step to begin 
building the picture about functioning of jury as an institution in Kazakhstan.  
To overcome the limitations of interviewing method and to determine whether there 
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is a real adversariality in the Kazakhstani jury trials, I made participant observation of a 
jury trial in the Specialized Interdistrict court for criminal cases of Astana city that lasted 
16 days during February 2017. This was a unique opportunity – I visited 14 trial sessions 
and made extensive field notes. As with my interviews, I had to be aware of the 
Hawthorne effect – adjusting by the research subjects to my presence. However, I do not 
think that my presence somehow influenced the decision-making of jurors, since they 
even did not know my status of observer until the very end. This is because I started to 
participate in trial prior to the jury selection process. So when jurors entered the 
courtroom I was already there, sitting quietly and making notes. Other observers 
surrounded me during the trial session. Later on I found out that they were friends and 
relatives of the victim and defendants sides. Most likely, jurors thought that I belonged to 
that group of observers. As for influence of my presence on the judge, prosecutor and 
advocates, it is interesting to note their reaction when I first time appeared on the court. 
Prior to the participation in court trial I have interviewed the Chair of Interdistrict 
Criminal court whom I asked about the possibility of observing the jury trial session. The 
judge informed me about the upcoming trial regarding the murder case, which was 
scheduled on 13th of February. I arrived to the court on the mentioned day and entered the 
courtroom. After the judge’s assistant mentioned everybody present in the courtroom, 
there was only me left who was not called by name. The judge was curious about my 
presence, thus he asked who I am. I answered that I was the external observer 
(nabliudatel) from Nazarbayev University and that I have already negotiated my 
observation with the Chair of the court. The Judge corrected me and said that I was not an 
observer, but instead was the listener (slushatel). Then he asked prosecutor, defense 
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attorneys, victims and defendants whether they were not against my participation in trial. 
None objected, and the judge permitted me to remain in the courtroom during the jury 
trial.  
This jury trial alone represented the 20% of the total number of jury trials in 2016 in 
Astana. That year, there have been only 5 jury trials conducted in Astana, and 4 out of 
them have been closed for public. So, I was fortunate that the case of the defendant 
Khadarov who had initially been accused of murder (Article 99, part 2 of the CCRK 
2014) and deliberate infliction of serious harm to health to two or more persons (Article 
106, part 2 of the CCRK 2014) and who was eventually found guilty in murder 
committed in a state of a strong sudden mental disturbance (Article 101, part 1 of the 
CCRK 2014) and infliction of harm to the health in affective state (Article 111 of the 
CCRK 2014) was open for public. I used this chance to observe this jury trial. This 
observation enabled me directly to collect evidence of key variables: the quality of 
evidence provided by prosecutors and defense, the presence of witnesses invited to trial, 
the judge’s responses on motions from prosecution and defense, the quality of arguments 
of prosecutors and defense during the discussion process, the behavior of jurors, judge, 
prosecutors, and attorneys, etc.  As far as I know, social scientists in Kazakhstan directly 
observe jury trials or court sessions from beginning to the end very rarely. To my 
knowledge, only twice similar method was conducted in Kazakhstan, in 2007 OSCE 
experts have observed 28 jury trials in 10 regional centers of Kazakhstan (OSCE Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2008). Another one was during 2009-2010 
LPRC and OSCE in cooperation with Supreme Court of Kazakhstan made a direct 
observation of 9 jury trials. Experts have attended jury court trials in cities of Astana, 
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Almaty, Kostanay and Kokshetau in order to provide recommendations and suggestions 
to improve this institution (LPRC 2010).  
While interviews and participant observation provided me with unique insights of 
particular criminal cases, I needed to get a bigger picture of jury trials from across the 
country. In order to collect the jury verdicts, I have searched media reports about the 
criminal cases that have been considered by juries in Kazakhstan. I have found 38 cases 
over the 2007-2016 years period that have been described in the online media outlets (i.e. 
zakon.kz; tengrinews.kz; 365info.kz; azzatyq.org; total.kz; times.kz; bnews.kz; nur.kz). 
Next, I searched these cases in the Supreme Court’s online service Sudebnyi Kabinet 
(office.sud.kz) in order to collect the texts of jury verdicts in the database Sudebnye 
prigovory (verdicts). However, information from these was very limited because 34 out 
of these 38 cases have been made secret and not published online. Therefore, in order to 
find out the greater number of criminal cases, I have used the online legal information 
service PARAGRAPH (prg.kz). This service was much more useful than the Supreme 
Court service. In PARAGRAPH, I have collected more than 300 jury verdicts as well as 
protocols of court trials conducted across 14 regions and the cities of Astana and Almaty 
between 2010 and 2015. It should be mentioned that verdicts for both single judge and 
jury trials are available on the online services of PARAGRAPH and Sudebnyi Kabinet 
for cases considered starting from 2010, while the services themselves have been only 
introduced in 2013. For that reason, many independent scholars as well as experts of non-
governmental organizations who investigated the criminal justice system in Kazakhstan 
including the jury trial practices (e.g. Kovalev 2006, 2010; Shaikenova 2011; OSCE 
OIHR 2007; LPRC 2010) relied upon the archival data during conducting their 
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researches. Unfortunately, not a single verdict issued in 2016 has been made available in 
online services because all jury verdicts issued that year have been closed for public 
access. The vast majority of verdicts, which I have collected, are in trials for drug-related 
crimes. A very small number of collected verdicts are in trials for murder, brigandage, 
extortion, etc. This is because most trials for crimes against the human dignity are closed 
for public observation. This secrecy in itself may be an indirect sign of resistance by the 
courts to reduce the popularity of the jury trials.  
In order to measure the pro-accusation bias, I analyzed annual statistics on 
convictions/acquittals in jury trial courts and judge-only courts from online service of 
General Prosecution office (pravstat.kz), the annual reports regarding the functioning of 
the criminal justice system published on web site of Supreme Court of Kazakhstan 
(sud.gov.kz), and lastly the official response of the Committee of Legal Statistics 
regarding my request dated by 1st of February. After extracting all the needed information 
I made up several tables (see below) in order to systematize my evidence. Generally, I 
calculated the verdicts regarding each tried individual, rather than each criminal case. 
This is because often time criminal cases are considered in relation to two and more 
persons. So, counting persons instead of cases provide more coherent statistics. Through 
this method I found significant differences between the outcomes of judge-only and jury 
trials regarding the acquittal rate in similar types of criminal cases.  
To understand the active resistance against the jury trials at the central level of 
government, I analyzed the amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code made in 2010, 
2013 and 2016 and which resulted either in actual reduction and fake expansion in types 
of cases that can be considered by the jury trial courts. To explore the public image of the 
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jury trials in Kazakhstan, I conducted a content analysis of public speeches and published 
interviews of prosecutors, judges and other government officials who argue against the 
use of jury trials, also opinions of popular attorneys who support the expansion of jury 
trials. 
As a result, by triangulating the data sources and methodology and using different 
levels of analysis, I was able to gain understanding of how and why jury trials work in 
Kazakhstan, how and why they are defended and attacked, and how and why citizens and 
state interact in criminal courts in the ways they do. 
Ethical and Political Considerations 
 
Prior to conducting interviews I introduced my participants with the oral consent 
form, where indicated that all the collected information could be used anonymously. 
Judges, prosecutors and jurors asked me not to mention their identities. The 
representatives of law enforcement agencies indicated that the findings from these 
interviews may negatively influence their reputation or career prospects, whereas jurors 
were banned from disclosing information about the details of jury deliberations. As for 
attorneys, they did not mind of being mentioned in the dissertation, and some of them 
even insisted to be indicated.  
Therefore, in order to protect my participants from any harm I kept their identities 
anonymous except for attorneys. In order to ensure it, I created acronyms (e.g. JR1-juror, 
JD1-judge, PR1-prosecutor). All collected identifying information is kept in my personal 
computer with the password. I did not reveal any sensitive information that could have 
posed threat to the career, reputation or other aspects of life of the respondents. Prior to 
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the submission of the final research work, I contacted my respondents and asked their 
permissions for the direct quotations.  
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Chapter 2. Theorizing About Jury Trials 
The Role of Judicial Systems in Non-Democracies 
 
In order to understand the Kazakhstani criminal proceedings it is important to 
consider the politics of criminal justice reforms in non-democracies first. What is the role 
of criminal justice system in the governance of the country by authoritative leaders? As 
scholars agree, rulers in authoritarian regimes maintain tight control over the judiciary 
and use criminal justice to punish their opponents. The main purpose of law and courts in 
these countries is to establish the order in the exercising of power by leaders. Moustafa 
(2007) provides the example of Egypt, where the president Mubarak restricted paths and 
eventually excluded all his opponents from the access to power through the laws, 
regulations, and criminal punishment. Similarly, Rajah (2012) provides the example of 
Singapore, where government eliminated opposition forces and autonomous media 
through the legal initiatives in the law. Most importantly, he demonstrated that key 
democratic indicators such as constitution, laws, court trials and election could be 
actually used against the maintenance of liberal values.  Landow (1999) describes the 
reasons why Lee Kuan Yew, the defense attorney and the man who made invaluable 
contribution for the development of Singapore, abolished the jury trials.  According to the 
author, Lee Kuan Yew, the graduate of Cambridge Law School, had extremely negative 
attitude toward the institution of juries. Author explains that Lee Kuan Yew was 
employed to defend four Muslim men who were accused of a murder of white British 
officer and his family: 
"…he did what any advocate does: He "worked on the weaknesses of the jury - 
their biases, their prejudices, their reluctance really to find four Mussulmen 
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[Muslims] guilty of killing in cold blood or in a heat of great passion, religious 
passion, an RAF officer, his wife and child." And he employed "the simple tricks 
of advocacy -- contradictions between one witness and another, contradiction 
between a witness and his previous statement to the police and the preliminary 
enquiry."" 
 
When the jury acquitted the murderers, Lee Kuan Kew reports, "The judge was 
thoroughly disgusted. I went home feeling quite sick because I knew I'd 
discharged my duty as required of me, but I knew I had done wrong." He 
thereupon concluded that no government in which he had a say would employ this 
foreign, "foolish, completely incongruous system." Pointing out that the French 
and other Latin nations do not use trial by jury, Lee Kuan Kew argues that it is 
too "alien" to the basic social attitudes of many other cultures, including those of 
Asia. (Landow 1999: para 2) 
 
It is interesting to note how President Nazarbayev highly praised the achievements made 
by his Asian colleague and sympathy toward him in the various interviews.  
“…during the whole period of our independence, I have been always in contact 
with Singapore. You know about my meetings with Mr. Lee Kuan Yew. Since, we 
acquired our independence, we have been considering your country as the model 
for our economic development” (Krasienko 2016) 
 
“…we have been close to each other, I considered him as the good friend [Lee 
Kuan Yew], I was learning his experience” (tengrinews.kz 2015) 
 
Moreover, another reason for the implementation of rules and laws in 
authoritarian states is the desire of leaders to establish control and maintain discipline 
over the state employees. By allowing ordinary citizens to appeal to courts authoritarian 
leaders get the opportunity of obtaining information regarding the misdemeanors of their 
subordinates. Peerenboom (2002) provides the classical case of how center manages 
bureaucratic discipline through law in the peripheries using the example of China. 
According to him, the vast territory and complex regulation structure diminished Chinese 
authorities control over the state apparatus. However, through the introduction of more 
than 1400 administrative courts all over the country, Chinese authorities significantly 
increased their supervision over the country. Wang and Fukurai (2015) point out that 
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although the jury institution existed in China from the 1954, the communist regime of 
Mao did not allow it to function. The situation has changed during the 1990s and the 
beginning of 2000s when after series of reforms the institution of peoples lay assessors 
have been introduced over the whole China in 2010. The distinctive feature of this 
institution is its role, as elected people are supposed to provide recommendations and 
evaluations regarding the investigation of criminal cases. This is performed in order to 
control the prosecution and investigation services and prevent any unlawful practices. 
However despite the functioning of institution of peoples lay assessors, Connor (2016) 
reports about “astronomical” conviction statistic in China, which in 2014 constituted 
99,92%. According to the author the reason for the pro-accusation bias in China is the 
fact that courts and prosecution offices are tightly controlled by Communist Party.  
Furthermore the opinion of Peerenboom regarding the controlling function of the 
courts is shared by Verner (1984), who indicates that during sixty years of one party 
system in Mexico, the ordinary people appealed to courts in order to protect themselves 
from the unlawful inspections of state agencies. The author emphasizes that the access of 
people toward the judicial system was not given with the purpose of enhancing their 
freedoms; instead the main goal was to improve the discipline within the state 
administration.  Bourchier (1999) points out that the widespread implementation of 
administrative courts in Indonesia have been done with the purpose of eradication of 
corruption within state apparatus. To be sure, corruption in criminal justice system is a 
serious problem in Kazakhstan, and the jury trials may reduce it. As I indicated above in 
my Hypothesis 3, it is more difficult to bribe 10 jurors instead of a single judge. It may 
also be possible that criminal justice professionals would not dare to engage in the 
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habitual informal relationships in front of the jury, thus, being forced to follow the letter 
of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
Another possible reason for the development of judicial infrastructure is the 
process of globalization. Authors suggest that authoritarian countries make reforms in 
their judicial systems in order to attract foreign investors, thus boost their economies (see, 
e.g. Kennedy and Stiglitz 2013; Lubman 1999; Peerenboom 2002). Silverstein (2008) and 
Rajah (2012) pointed out that Singapore became the blueprint of maintaining economic 
success with the disciplined control over the power for all authoritarian states. 
Furthermore, non-democratic regimes through delegating some disputes to be resolved by 
the judiciary may avoid some unnecessary conflict situations, social unrest, protests, etc. 
Moustafa (2007) points out that president Mubarak managed to employ this strategy 
during promotion of controversial initiatives in Egypt. So, it can be concluded that in 
non-democratic regimes authorities maintain tight control over the judiciary and use it in 
order to legitimize their power. However, there is no evidence that foreign investors or 
the U.S.-based experts advocated for jury trials in Kazakhstan. Moreover, if transnational 
corporations hate jury trials in the U.S., why would they prefer them in Kazakhstan? A 
stronger reason might be that jury trials in Kazakhstan provide the only possible 
mechanism for producing fairer verdicts in prosecuting grave crimes, something that an 
average foreign investor would prefer in any country. 
However, not all reforms in authoritarian states can be explained from the 
“controlling purpose” standpoint. According to Markovits (2004), the introduction of jury 
trials in the Russian Federation, which was actively promoted by the U.S. advisers to the 
Boris Yeltsin’s administration, represented the paradoxical situation. Since Russian 
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government implemented the western adversarial institute into their inquisitorial judicial 
system. Author did not understand the purpose of this “transplantation”, since she 
believes that the trial by jury as an institution represents core American values such as 
independence and impartiality in decision-making, presumption of innocence, human 
rights, etc. But all these values have been clearly disregarded in the Russian context; 
nevertheless author suggests that possible reason for the adoption of jury institution 
within Russian continental judicial system could be the romantic purpose, motivated by 
Hollywood movies, to pursue the judicial standards of western world. Could the same be 
true of Kazakhstani leaders? Addressing this cultural explanation brings us to the need to 
learn about the criminal justice in post-Soviet states. 
Post-Soviet Criminal Justice Systems: Biased, Corrupt, and Informal  
 
The 70 years of USSR’s history left the footprints almost in all institutional areas 
of its former member states. Many authors describe how judicial practices of these 
countries have been significantly influenced by Soviet legacy (e.g. Solomon 2004; 
Volkov 2000; Paneyakh 2014; Ledeneva 2013; Trochev 2014). Therefore, in order to 
understand the Kazakhstani legal system it is important to consider it within the 
framework of post-soviet states. To begin with, the independence of judicial branch of 
the government is universally considered as the key factor for effective and impartial 
justice system. For that reason almost all countries in the world particularly mention the 
principle of judicial independence in their constitutions (France Constitution, Article 64; 
Germany’s Constitution, article 97; Denmark’s Constitution, article 62; etc.) as well as 
major international agreements indicate them in their documents (UDHR, article 10; UN 
Main principles on the independence of judicial systems). So, it is not a surprise that the 
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USSR has also formally supported this principle through the article 112 in the 
Constitution from 1936 and article 155 in the Constitution from 1977. Consequently, all 
former Soviet states underline the concept of power separation in their constitutions 
(Kazakhstani Constitution, article 3; Russian Federation’s Constitution, article 10; 
Kyrgyzstan’s Constitution, article 7; Uzbekistan’s Constitution, article 11; Ukrainian 
Constitution, article 6; Belarus Constitution, article 6; etc.). Kovalev (2010) indicates 
that despite the official recognition of the principle of judicial independence by former 
soviet states, the real practices demonstrate that judges in these states are far away from 
being considered as the independent. According to him, several studies conducted by 
American Bar Association demonstrate that judge selection processes in these countries 
are not transparent and fair. Judicial appointment procedures are characterized by the 
politics of favoritism, which means that exams for assessing qualifications are only 
reliable on paper, since preferred applicants have higher chances to be selected to serve 
on the bench. It follows that corruption and connections with political elites play great 
part in the judges’ selection procedures. Corruption and informal connections, then, mark 
a key feature of how criminal justice system works in the shadow of various procedural 
codes and directives. In itself, however, corruption does not produce pro-accusation bias, 
it produces the bias in favor of the highest paying party. For example, judges and 
prosecutors in Bulgaria collude and fail to prosecute and sentence mafia bosses and 
connected with the government officials (Popova 2012). 
Another aspect of judges’ low professional status is the fact that in former soviet 
states most of courts’ decisions are influenced by the authorities both on regional and 
central level. This is especially true when it comes to political cases. As Solomon and 
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Foglesong (2000) point out the “telephone justice” (it is informal and illegal practices 
that have been originated in Soviet Union, when authorities contacted the judges with the 
purpose of influencing on their decisions) practices are widely used by all the former 
soviet states. Similarly, according to Ledeneva (2008) in the USSR law has been 
instrumentalized by communist leaders. This has not been changed with the collapse of 
Soviet Union, in contemporary Russia various interest groups, including elites continue 
to exploit the law. Author explicitly describes the pinnacle of Russian informal practices, 
which is called Telefonnoe pravo (telephone justice). In the Russian context, oral 
commands are used by authorities to bypass the laws and regulations, through this 
informal instrument, they may protect their interests in courts. Nikitinskii (2005) points 
out that in Russia the judicial pyramid is reversed; the courts are in the bottom of 
hierarchy, which means that every authority may order judges to issue suitable verdicts. 
In common law countries the courts and judges are on the top of judicial hierarchy, which 
means that no one can influence on their decision-making. Furthermore, according to 
Pashin (2001) prosecution and even investigation services may intervene in the judges’ 
decision-making processes by making recommendations, requesting or even demanding 
the suitable verdict.  
Furthermore, Kovalev (2010) indicates in most of post-soviet states judges are 
appointed for short period, the term on the bench is strictly limited. For instance, the 
office term for judges in Azerbaijan is 10 years for judges of supreme court, for judges of 
regional courts is 5 years; in Georgia for judges of all courts 10 years; in Kyrgyzstan for 
judges of all courts 7 years; in Turkmenistan all judges are appointed for 5 years; in 
Kazakhstan the head of supreme court as well as heads of civil and criminal courts are 
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appointed for 5 years period. As a result, judges are obliged to demonstrate their loyalty 
to the higher authorities in order to be reelected for new terms. Those judges who do not 
obey the instructions from authorities but rather want to decide cases according to their 
own beliefs can be easily dismissed from their services. There are various examples to 
support this argument, for instance ex-judge from Moscow court Melikov described how 
he was sacked due to his liberal views regarding the criminal cases, the Belarus judge 
from constitutional court Pastukhov was sacked by the President because of the 
commentaries regarding the impeachment (Usacheva 2004).  
Moreover, according to many scholars one of the distinctive features of post-
soviet countries’ judicial practices is the existence of pro-accusation bias. There is a trend 
among judges to suppose that defendants are in most cases guilty of alleged crimes. 
Alekseeva (1989) indicates that judges with such bias are likely to neglect evidence and 
arguments provided by defense side and in contrast exaggerate the importance of the 
arguments provided by prosecution party. There are various justifications for such 
phenomenon, Kovalev (2010) suggests that accusation bias takes roots from long 
standing Soviet tradition of ignorance and dislike of the universally recognized principle 
of human rights. The main strategy in courts during Soviet period was excluding any 
possibility of acquittal of the guilty person. This tendency has been transmitted into 
current judicial practices. Another reason for the existence of accusation bias is the 
argument that judges over time become more resilient towards issuing acquittal verdicts. 
In other words, by considering cases on regular basis they engage in the process of 
professional deformation, which causes indifferent attitude of judges toward the fate of 
defendant. Consequently, they can no longer adequately assess defense’s arguments and 
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evidences. Although this process may occur in the criminal systems of developed western 
states (e.g. Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard 1995), Kovalev argues that in post-Soviet states 
this process is deliberately stimulated and supported by governments. What is more, 
according to Shvarts (2004) the substantial proportion of judges in former Soviet states 
come from the police or prosecution services, which already have the bias against any 
suspects.  
Kovalev (2010) indicates that another reason for the accusation bias in former 
Soviet states is the long standing practice among judges to learn the report prepared by 
investigators and processed by prosecutors (fabula obvineniya) before the actual trials. 
He suggests that such single perspective summary of the crime influences on the 
decision-making of judges in a way that they become more loyal towards the arguments 
of prosecutors during the trials. Most importantly, the criminal codes of the CIS countries 
imply that judge after the consideration of the preliminary crime report should decide 
whether to announce the main court trial, send case back to the additional investigation, 
postpone the main hearings, direct the case for the jurisdiction of another court or put an 
end for the case. Consequently, in former Soviet states the judge who concludes that there 
are enough proves to bring the case to the trial, is the judge who delivers the final verdict 
after the main hearings. So, it is argued that judges are unable to deliver impartial 
verdicts, since they already considered the accused person as guilty by bringing the case 
to the main hearings. The Russian psychologist Panasiuk (1994) found out that Russian 
judges determined that suspects were guilty of alleged crimes during the consideration of 
pre-trial reports prepared by investigation and prosecution services.  
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The Kovalev’s arguments are backed by Solomon (2004), who also emphasizes 
that the Soviet legal system was characterized by “strong prosecutorial bias” that has 
been supported by informal practices. The prosecution and defense sides before and 
during the trial processes were in absolutely unequal positions. The one of the key 
informal practices in judicial system was the discouragement of acquittal verdicts. 
Solomon argues that judicial system in Russian Federation has experienced significant 
changes both under the presidencies of Yeltsin and Putin. He indicates that under the 
President Yeltsin, Russian authorities started the reformation process of judiciary system. 
Judges did get more independence by being able to serve unlimited terms. However, the 
government failed to maintain further development, since it did not have enough funds to 
support the system. With the arrival of Putin, Russian authorities continued to develop 
the judiciary system. Jury courts were introduced as an alternative to ordinary trials in all 
provinces, salaries of judges and other staff involved in the judiciary process were 
significantly increased, infrastructure and material base were developed. However, 
Putin’s administration did not eliminate the informal practices that take place within and 
outside the judiciary system. Sometimes, elites interfere into the cases and change their 
outcome.  
Furthermore, informal links within state apparatus influence on the career 
prospects of judges. In other words, they strongly depend from their relations with 
influential political figures. As a result, lack of independence, forces judges to announce 
verdicts that comfort the interested group of people. Solomon (2004) makes several 
recommendations for Russian authorities in order to develop the judiciary system. Firstly, 
it is suggested to reform the chairs of court institution, which has enormous influence on 
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judges. Instead of being appointed directly by President, member of chairs should be 
elected by fellow judges. Furthermore, the system of discipline, and selection of judges 
should reconsidered so that their overall effectiveness would be increased. Also, 
particular education programs such as psychology, critical thinking, etc. should be 
included in the training programs designed specifically for judges. Next, the judge 
performance evaluation system should be changed. Rather than relying on 
approval/reversal statistics, the quality of decisions should be evaluated. Lastly, author 
suggests taking into consideration public opinion polls in regard to justice system, so that 
authorities would be aware of the people’s trust level to the judges. Solomon (2004) 
suggests that Russia is far away from being considered as the country with the established 
legal order. He emphasizes that Russian authorities consider the laws as the means to 
achieve their own ends.  
One of the frequently indicators of pro-accusation bias is the acquittal rate in post-
Soviet states. According to Kovalev (2010), the acquittal rates in single-judge trials 
across all post-Soviet states is less than 1%. This data seems to be reliable, as my own 
investigation bucked up this numbers regarding Kazakhstani case. Another essential 
characteristic of accusation bias is the judges’ regular negligence of the principle of 
adversarial trial procedure. The concept of equality between prosecution and defense 
sides is widely recognized as the cornerstone of fair and impartial trials. The criminal 
procedure codes of all post-Soviet states underline this principle, however real practices 
demonstrate regular violation of this principle by professional judges. Kovalev points out 
that judges greatly favor prosecutors, this preferential treatment may come in different 
fashions: overturning the defense side’s appeals regarding illegally collected evidences, 
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restricting the rights of defense side to demonstrate evidences, summon witnesses, 
invitation of external experts in order to examine the prosecution’s evidences, etc. 
Jokhar Utebekov (2015), the Kazakhstani popular attorney, indicates about very 
high accusation bias in contemporary judicial practices in Kazakhstan. According to him, 
the acquittal rate in the judicial system is only about 0.1-0.2% for all the cases. Utebekov, 
points out that even in 1937 the acquittal rate in Soviet Union were about 5%, while 
overall in different periods of Soviet times it varied from 3% to 10%. According to him, 
the primary reason for the accusation bias in Kazakhstan is the legacy of soviet 
totalitarian regime. The judges evaluated in Kazakhstan not according to their 
professionalism or quality of verdicts, but according to statistics of their overturned cases. 
In other words, higher judiciary instance may easily cancel the acquittal verdicts of 
judges. The more is the number of refusals from higher instances, the higher is the chance 
that judge would be dismissed from his duties. Consequently, judges experience the 
professional deformation, they do not care about the fairness and morality of verdict, but 
they think about whether the higher instance would overturn their decision in near future. 
As a result, judges make preliminary agreement with higher judicial instances about the 
outcome of the cases. Also, Utebekov points out that the cancellation of judges’ decisions 
is the useful instrument of authorities to get rid of unwanted judges. Also, Utebekov 
(2016) describes the informal links between the main parties of trials, namely, 
prosecution, investigation and judges. To be more precise, all these parties are interested 
in accusing the defendant. This is because the acquittal verdict will demonstrate the weak 
preliminary work of investigators as well as will question the legitimacy of prosecutors’ 
accusations. On top of that, it will have negative effect on judges’ performance statistics. 
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As a result, all these parties from the very beginning of trials are interested in producing 
the guilty verdict. 
Another problem that criminal justice systems face in each of the post-Soviet 
states is the extensive corruption. According to various studies and surveys of 
international organizations the institutions of police, prosecution and courts are among 
the most corrupted in the post-Soviet areas (e.g. Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi 2003; 
Steve and Rousso 2003). As Kovalev indicates in 2008 according to the Transparency 
International’s corruption index former Soviet countries ranked between 67 and 166 
places in the global rating. It goes without saying that all the people highly evaluate their 
freedoms and liberties, therefore when they are persecuted for crimes, they are willing to 
escape it at all financial costs. In post-Soviet states, the defense counsel is often the 
negotiator of bribery between the defendant from one side and prosecutor and judge on 
the other side (Petrukhin 2000; Tselms 2002; Garmaev 2003). Scholars explain this 
phenomenon by significantly low acquittal statistics, which push defendants toward 
finding alternative ways of winning their cases. Similarly, advocates understand that 
there is a low possibility of persuading prosecutor to waive the charges or convincing 
judge to issue the acquittal verdict, therefore defense advocates take the roles of 
intermediaries between the accused person and prosecutor/judge sides. Usually these 
informally negotiating attorneys come from the law-enforcement agencies’ background. 
Their well-established connections with their previous colleagues help them to establish 
informal contacts with prosecutors and judges, thus determine the outcome of the case 
through certain amount of bribe.  
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Finally, scholars note the low quality of criminal investigators, who often times 
illegally abuse detainees to obtain confessions and also fabricate evidences that have been 
presented in the court. Various studies indicated the violation of basic human rights by 
police in post-Soviet states, who regularly use physical force and coercion on suspects in 
order to extract the confessions (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2016). Kovalev (2010) argues that court trials often times take place month’s or even 
years after the suspects have been detained in custody. So, it is impossible for them to 
demonstrate marks of physical abuse, during the trials. As for judges, their responses to 
suspects’ inquiries are only limited by questioning the interrogators who were supposedly 
involved in physical harassment. Obviously, investigators never confirm allegations of 
torture regarding the suspects, consequently judges overturn motions from defendants.  
Empirical Investigation of Disparities between Judges and Juries 
Decision-Making 
 
Although both juries and judges authorized to determine the guilt of individuals, 
there is a clear disparity in the actual verdicts. Various scholars made an attempt to 
compare judges and juries decision-making. In order to understand what factors influence 
on the decision-making of juries, we should analyze western countries experiences with 
jury trials. Particularly, it is better to consider juries in the U.S., since its jurisdiction is 
recognized as the example for many other states. Several methodological approaches 
were used by researches to measure the difference in opinions between judges and juries. 
Generally all the studies could be divided into three categories, which are judges and 
juries agreement researches, archival data analyses and experimental studies. The first 
two methods investigate the decisions of judges and juries in real situations. The 
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advantage of judge-jury agreement researches is that both decision-makers consider 
identical cases, however one party usually analyze the case as the post-factum. As for 
archival studies, the pros is that both types of decision-makers are analyzed in accordance 
with their real trial cases, when juries and judges were performing their responsibilities, 
but cons is that judges and juries did not consider identical cases. The third type of 
research that scholars conducted to study the decision-making of judges and juries is 
based on experiments. This method allows researchers to test decision-makers analytical 
capabilities through asking them to analyze facts and data related to trials. The findings 
from all the mentioned studies below could be used to make comparisons with 
Kazakhstani statistics. Also, scholarly methods of collecting data could be successfully 
replicated in my own research. 
 
Exploring the judge-juries agreement rate  
One of the classical studies that investigate the divergences in juries and judges 
verdicts in America was conducted by Kalven and Zeisel (1967). The authors examined 
3,576 criminal and about 4,000 civil cases, and asked questionnaires from 55 professional 
judges about their opinions regarding the outcome of these cases. Also judges were asked 
what would be their decision if they have considered cases instead of juries. Lastly, 
judges were asked to explain their views that are different from juries.  Kalven and Zeisel 
have found that in 78% of cases Judges would have announced the same verdict as Juries. 
In 19% of trials Judges would give punitive verdict compared to Juries decisions and in 
3% of cases Judges would have acquitted suspects compared to Juries’ guilty verdict. The 
study indicates that primary reasons for the divergence in the opinion of Judges and 
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Juries are due to problems with evidence, attitudes of lay assessors regarding the law, 
emotional feelings of juries about defendants, personal investigation of information by 
the judge, the greater influence of defendant lawyers on juries. 
Are juries capable of understanding provided evidence? Kalven and Zeisel claim 
that juries do comprehend the evidence, because in most of the cases (78%) juries and 
judges came to the same verdict. However, when the evidence is weak, juries are more 
inclined to take the defendant’s stand compared to judges. Furthermore, authors indicate 
that juries tend to have the negative view regarding punishments for certain crimes 
mentioned in the Law. To be more precise, juries believe that some punishments are very 
harsh, especially when it comes to drunken individuals. Consequently, during the trials 
juries tend to acquit those defendants who were believed to be drunk in the process of 
crime.  
Moreover, in some cases juries feel sympathetic toward defendants. This may 
happen when suspects fall under the socially vulnerable category of people. Also 
personal live stories of defendants may have huge impact on juries’ decision-making. 
Another reason of disagreement between Judge’s and Juries verdicts are that Judges have 
the access to the prior criminal record of suspects, whereas Juries cannot have such 
information, since suspects do not testify about that. It is interesting to note that the least 
important factor that is responsible for the disparity between Judge’s and Juries decisions 
is the arguments of advocates. 
Heuer and Penrod (1994) conducted the similar research to the Kalven and Zeisel 
and investigated the agreement rate between judge’s and juries decisions across 33 
American states in 77 criminal and 67 civil cases. The authors found that for criminal 
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cases judges would have announced the same guilty verdict in 73% of trials. In about 3% 
of trials Juries convicted suspects, while Judges would have cleared individuals of all 
allegations. Furthermore, in 25% of trials juries acquitted suspects, while judges would 
have sentenced. As for, civil cases the judges would have agreed with juries in 63% of 
trials. The disagreements among Judges and Juries decisions were equally distributed, 
with judges acquitting suspects in 18% of cases where juries made opposite verdict, and 
19% of trials where Judges would have announced guilty verdict as opposed to the juries 
lenient verdicts.  
Eisenberg et al. (2005) studied judge-jury agreement in the states of California, 
Arizona, New York and South Carolina over three hundred criminal cases. It is 
interesting to note, how results from this study is similar to one’s found by Kalven and 
Zeisel. Eisenberg et al. determine that judges in 75% of cases would have provided the 
similar verdict as juries. Furthermore, in 6% of trials Judges would have freed suspects as 
opposed to Juries. Whereas, in 19% of cases Judges would have sentenced detainees in 
contrast to Juries. Similar to other researches, Eisenberg et al. do not find any relation 
between the complexity of the cases and the level of disparity between the Judges and 
Juries. In addition, the authors indicate that Juries set higher requirements for determining 
guilt compared to Judges. 
To conclude, these ways of studying decision-making of judges and juries 
demonstrate similarities in outcomes: on average, judges would agree with juries in three 
out of four times. 
 
Archival data 
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Another way of comparing judge and juries trial verdicts is to study the outcomes 
of actual trials. The advantage of this method is that scholars investigate the actual 
verdicts, instead of finding the hypothetical outcomes of judges’ decision-making and 
comparing them with juries’ verdicts. Clermont and Eisenberg (1992) analyzed data from 
the United States Administrative Courts Database over the 1979-1989 periods. Scholars 
discovered that in most cases there were no notable disparities in plaintiff success level 
either in front of judges or juries. However, the researchers found that plaintiffs won 
cases on a higher rate before judges in certain cases, namely, medical cases, author’s 
right cases, car accident cases. Interestingly, the authors find out that plaintiffs are 
expected to perform strong in front of judges in those types of cases, where they have the 
similar high success rate before juries. Furthermore, in another study Eisenberg et al. 
(2002) used data from the Civil Trial Court Network, where they investigated over 9,000 
civil trials in 1996. Their findings were somehow different to previous studies, since they 
found that plaintiffs won on a higher occasions before Judges (62%) than before Juries 
(47%). 
More recently, Helland and Tabarrok (2000) analyzed archival data in the US on 
middle-level crimes that have deteriorating effect on the health of plaintiffs over 1988-
1996 periods. According to the authors the plaintiff success rate in front of judges 
constituted 86%, whereas before juries this statistics were 72%. Scholars suggest that the 
disparities in Judges and Juries decision-making could be explained by the divergences in 
the criminal episodes they considered. Overall, scholars who studied archival data have 
an advantage, since they compared Judge and Juries verdicts on real cases situations. 
However, the main limitation of these studies is the fact the findings could be biased 
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since each incident is unique and participants, namely plaintiffs and suspects may be of 
different background. In short, similar to the findings of the judge-jury agreement rate, 
the difference in outcomes of judge vs. jury verdicts exists but it is not large. 
 
Experimental studies 
Lehman, Lempert and Nisbett (1988) studied the common prejudice that juries in 
the US are not capable of understanding scientific and statistical evidence presented on 
trials. The scholars came to conclusion that juries do experience problems with such type 
of data, however they point out that judges also face difficulties with scientific and 
statistical data. This is because many judges come from law schools, while the law school 
curricula do not pay much attention on scientific and statistical courses. Therefore, 
authors argue that judges and juries are in an equal position when it comes to analyze 
highly complicated scientific evidence. 
Robbennolot (2005) argues that both judges and juries bring advantages and 
disadvantages to the court. The differences in decision making could be because of 
improved collective efforts of juries or in contrast because of professional qualities of 
judges. In other words, trial by jurors could be effective way of deciding one’s fate, since 
jurors operate as a group and they usually represent the different social classes of the 
community. However, the divergence in the opinion of judges and juries could be due to 
comparative advantage of judges. To be more precise, judges are expected to have better 
experience and knowledge about judicial system. Furthermore, regular participation in 
trials may develop the better understanding of facts and evidences, which is helpful for 
providing fair verdict. 
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In short, scholars again find that difference between judges and jurors exists but it 
is not pre-determined who would be fairer in deciding criminal cases. 
Why Are Juries Different from Judges? 
 
Participation of juries in the administration of justice is historically considered as 
the protection against regimes’ oppressions. According to the Blackstone (1809), the 
institution of juries in England set huge obstacle for Crown’s desire of promotion own 
interests over the freedoms and liberties of public. Devlin (1956) shares the opinion 
Blackstone, he considers the jury trials as the safeguard of peoples’ sovereignty against 
the despotism of political power.  
Moreover, jurors are considered to be the guardians of public faith in the US, also 
they deliver the voice of the society within the legal system prevailed by bureaucratic 
prosecutors and judges (e.g. Gobert 1994; Hannaford and Munsterman 1997; Hazelwood 
and Brigham 1998). Moreover, the possibility for the defendant to enjoy the trial that is 
judged by the person’s peers is the fundamental principle of not only the American 
judicial system, but also that of any other developed countries. In fact, according to the 
Byron White, former member of the U.S. Supreme Court: 
“providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an 
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against 
the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." (Duncan v. Louisiana 1968) 
 
Boatright (1999) point out that the jury panel consisting of the ordinary citizens 
helps defendant to be confident that court’s decision would be free of any bias and 
prejudice, especially in the corruption cases, where judges themselves often get involved. 
Next, scientists indicate that the jury service enables people to take active part in the 
judicial branch of the government. Participation of ordinary citizen in the trial process 
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could be considered as the firsthand experience with the framework of the judicial 
system, consequently it helps to develop the trust of society toward legal system, which 
eventually contributes to the wider support of the judicial system by the citizens (e.g. 
Hamilton 1978; Baldwin and McConville 1980; Boyl 1991). Most importantly, scholars 
point out that participation of people in jury trials allows the country to set a platform for 
the building of the civic society. In other words, there is a positive correlation between 
the amount of jury trials and the participation of citizens in the political life of the nation. 
This is because; trial process implicates great benefits on the personal development of 
individuals. People begin to perceive how crucial it is to determine one’s guilt or 
innocence. Consequently, it affects the individuals own decision-making and behavior in 
daily life, they become more active and supportive to governments’ initiatives as well as 
more obedient to rules and regulations. Ultimately, it changes the whole society in a way 
that they become more inclined toward the development of democratic values and 
institutions within nation (e.g. Vidmar et al 1997; Wolf and Sarat 1998).  
On the contrary, many scholars argue that the use of mixed court (i.e. judge and 
juries both determine the question of guilt and the measure of punishment) as opposed to 
pure jury court (i.e. juries determine the question of guilt, while judge determine the 
measure of punishment) do not guarantee the independent and impartial trials. Various 
studies indicated that in mixed court trials there is a tendency that juries in most cases are 
likely to agree with the opinion of judge (e.g. Casper and Zeisel, 1972; Ivkovic, 1999; 
Kovalev, 2004). Furthermore, not all scholars consider juries as the effective instrument 
against the repressions of the governments and overall questioned the need for this 
institution in the judicial systems of countries. Ferri (1895) argues that under the rule of 
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despotic leader juries are unable to demonstrate their independence and impartiality 
during trials as well as they cannot prevent corruption within government or abuses of 
judges by authorities. On top of that, he suggests that in democratic states there is no need 
for the institution of juries, since in these countries judges are already independent. 
The Role of Jury Trials in Legal Reforms in Post-Soviet States 
 
Having identified the main problems in the criminal justice systems of post-soviet 
countries and investigated the empirical studies regarding judges/juries decision-making 
it is important to find out the opinions of scholars regarding the role of jury trials in 
judicial systems around the world as well as in former Soviet states. From the one side 
the jury institution may remarkably benefit the legal systems by discouraging law 
enforcement agencies of using informal practices on the other side the participation of 
juries in the administration of justice can play only symbolic role in the legal systems. To 
begin with, according to Kovalev (2010), the main advantage of juries over the judges in 
post-Soviet context is the fact that they are not accountable either to higher judicial 
instances (reducing internal judicial dependence) or the government (reducing external 
judicial dependence). This absence of responsibility makes juries independent decision-
makers and allows them to consider criminal cases according to their own believes and 
faiths. On the contrary, judges in post-Soviet area are only accountable to the 
government, since authorities appoint judges, not general public. The Kovalev’s views 
supported by other authors, Gleadow (2000) points out that the introduction of jury 
institution in Spain in 1995 has positively influenced the emergence of autonomous and 
powerful courts.  
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There is no consensus among scholars regarding the influence of juries on the 
aversariality of criminal proceedings. The opponents of jury trials provide the examples 
of Netherlands, Israel and Singapore who managed to establish impartial courts without 
the assistance of juries (e.g. Koppen and Penrod 2003; Swart 1993; Harnon and Stein, 
1999). On the other side Gleadow (2000) points out that introduction of jury trials in 
Spain made the trials processes more adversarial and maintained the principle of equality 
between the prosecutors and advocates. Kovalev (2010) believes that jury institution has 
positive influence on the court trials, since juries are not bounded by responsibilities in 
front of the government compared to judges and thus they are free to judge cases 
impartially. Consequently, it motivates both prosecutors and advocates to prepare better 
for trials, since they understand that they need to persuade not just a single judge, but 
twelve individuals with different backgrounds and believes. Melnikov (1993) points out 
that although jury trials increase the power of defense counsel, they are negatively 
influence on their professionalism, as lawyers become more and more inclined towards 
development of their public skills to impress juries, rather than paying attention to 
thorough examination of the evidence. 
Kovalev (2010) suggests that jury institution can be considered as the effective 
instrument to combat corruption within judicial systems. It becomes increasingly difficult 
for judges to take bribes, once juries are introduced into the trials. This is because, judges 
can no longer guarantee the outcome of the case for the interested parties. Opponents of 
jury trials argue that juries may as well take bribes, Cornish (1968) indicates that in the 
United Kingdom there is a higher possibility of engagement into corruption from the 
juries rather than from the judges. However, this view is opposed by Kovalev, who 
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argues that in the context of post-Soviet countries judges by all means are more inclined 
toward bribery than juries. This is because juries are not used to take bribes on a regular 
basis; it is very risky for parties to contact juries, since there are no intermediaries who 
can establish connections with lay participants. On top of that, juries themselves in most 
cases categorically against of taking any bribes, they are afraid of being approached by 
unknown parties. Furthermore, according to Kovalev, early jury trials in Russia 
demonstrated the weaknesses of investigation and prosecution services, since the low 
quality of provided evidences were exposed at the jury trials during the cross-
examination of defendants and witnesses. Consequently, an increase of acquittal verdicts 
lead to the reduction in salary bonuses to law enforcement employees and most 
importantly to the deterioration of their career prospects. This is because acquittal 
verdicts demonstrated that investigators and prosecutors did not perform their duties 
properly. For that reason, Kovalev argues that widespread use of jury trials in post-Soviet 
area would significantly develop the professionalism of investigators and prosecutors. 
The Challenges for Jury Trials in Kazakhstan 
 
There are few studies that have analyzed particularly Kazakhstani experience of 
Jury trials. Some authors refer to our historical experience, when all the major disputes 
have been solved through the ancient institution of bii’s courts or Sud Biev (e.g. 
Abdrasulov 2008; Brusina 2008; Zimanov 2010; Aitkhozhin 2015). These scholars 
indicate that Sud Biev have the features of contemporary jury trials such as the 
deliberation process and the delivery of mutual verdict. However the main difference is 
that Sud Biev tried to mitigate conflicts, whereas jury trials are about punishment or 
acquittal of the defendants. Going to contemporary legal practices, some authors blame 
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the Kazakhstani path of jury trials. They indicate that the French model of jury panel is 
not actually applicable to our country. This is because, putting the judge into the one 
room to discuss the case and determine the verdict brings different scenario than in 
France. To be more precise, experts argue that in Kazakhstan judges tend to pressure and 
influence the decisions of the juries, while in France they actually help juries to 
acknowledge and evaluate all the evidence in the correct way (e.g. Fedotova 2009; 
Shaikenova 2009; Baitukenov 2015). 
Nikolai Kovalev (2010) has comprehensively studied the early years of 
Kazakhstani jury experiences. He provides insights into the Kazakhstani mixed courts 
trials practices during 2005-2010, describes the preliminary stages of the trial 
implementation process, and indicates reforms related to trials and makes valuable 
recommendations for the further development of the jury institutions in Kazakhstan. 
However, several years have passed since the Kovalev’s last investigation of jury trials in 
the state. The jury institution has experienced the changes in its jurisdiction, the reasons 
for these variations need to be studied more closely. 
Furthermore, the Kazakhstani defense lawyers’ community in general supports 
the use of jury trials, since they believe that this institution has potential to improve the 
judicial practices in the state. However many attorneys argue that currently jury 
institution plays a largely symbolic role. Daniyar Kanafin (2017), the member of the 
Chair of the Republican collegium of Advocates points out that majority of people in 
Kazakhstan do not even know about the existence of jury trials in the state. He indicates 
that the development of this institution is greatly opposed by judiciary, prosecution and 
investigation agencies, which are not interested in its expansion due to well-established 
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informal practices within the criminal justice system. Kanafins’s opinion is shared by 
Utebekov (2015), who emphasize that in Kazakhstani jury trial practices judges 
constantly manipulate the opinions of juries in the deliberation room in order to acquire 
the convenient verdict.  
In short, the reviewed literature does not fully explain how and why jury trials 
produce fairer verdicts than judge-only trials. Neither does it offer a coherent explanation 
of how criminal justice professionals have been successful in resisting President 
Nazarbayev’s orders to expand jury trials and make mandatory some of them. Having 
read and analyzed all arguments of scholars, who discussed both Western and 
Kazakhstani jury practices it can be concluded that there is still a large gap in our 
understanding of the politics of jury trials in Kazakhstan, the only country in Central Asia 
that has this institution in its criminal justice system. To my knowledge, there is no study, 
which explores the reasons for the institutional resistance of President’s propositions in 
authoritarian regime, and more broadly, how dynamics of laypeople participation in 
criminal justice change the relationships among and within law-enforcement agencies on 
the ground in non-democratic context. 
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Chapter 3. Big Picture: Expansion, Reduction, and “Fake” Expansion 
of Jury Trial Courts in the Criminal Justice System of Kazakhstan 
 
Judging by the changes to the jurisdiction of the jury trial courts and the actual 
number of cases decided by them in Kazakhstan, it becomes clear that the criminal justice 
system resists them because juries reduce pro-accusation bias. It is widely acknowledged 
that Kazakhstani judicial system characterized by so-called “accusation bias” (e.g. 
Kovalev 2010; Solomon 2006; Ledeneva 2004; Thaman 2004). These arguments are 
supported by official court statistics. The Table 1 demonstrates statistics from the 
Supreme Court of Kazakhstan regarding acquittal/conviction rates in criminal court trials 
during the recent years. As it can be noticed the percentage of acquittals in criminal cases 
with public prosecution (i.e. criminal court trials where the prosecutor is presented) 
varied between 0,2-0,5%, while the conviction rates respectively were higher than 99 % 
in those years. Note that most of acquittals have been delivered in cases of private 
prosecution, in which state prosecutors do not take part. 
In order to understand the magnitude of these statistics, it is worth considering 
other countries’ data. For instance, according to the United States Bureau of Justice 
Statistics the conviction rate in criminal cases in recent years varied between 65-80% 
across different states (bjs.gov 2016). In the United Kingdom according to the Supreme 
Court conviction rate in last ten years varied between 75% and 82% (supremecourt.uk 
2016). So these conviction rates are far below from Kazakhstani practices, where in 
approximately 99% of cases, which end with sentence, the defendants are convicted. In 
other words, it means that in Kazakhstan if the case of public prosecution goes to the 
trial, ordinary citizen has virtually no chance of being found not guilty.  
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Table 1. Conviction and Acquittal Rates in Kazakhstani Criminal 
Courts, 2009 – 2016 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total number of 
criminal cases with 
sentences issued 
34, 667 30, 432 22, 012 18, 230 21, 833 20, 571 28, 031 27, 989 
Including the cases 
with private 
prosecution 
1,333 1,338 708 383 454 565 1,192 1,520 
Total number of 
persons tried with 
private prosecution 
1,515 1,567 796 491 620 675 1,448 1,848 
Number of 
convicted persons 
with private 
prosecution 
980 968 408 173 184 238 867 1,034 
Number of 
acquitted persons 
with private 
prosecution 
535 599 388 318 436 437 581 814 
Including the cases 
with public 
prosecution 
33, 334 29, 094 21, 304 17, 847 21, 379 20, 006 26, 839 26, 469 
Total number of 
people tried with 
public prosecution 
39, 717 35, 741 27, 066 22, 831 26, 855 24, 882 30, 898 30, 861 
Number of 
convicted persons 
with public 
prosecution 
39, 629 35, 633 26, 972 22, 749 26, 784 24, 841 30, 736 30, 789 
Ratio of convicted 
persons 99.8 % 99.7 % 99.7 % 99.6 % 99.7 % 99.8 % 99.5 % 99.8 % 
Number of 
acquitted persons 
with public 
prosecution 
88 108 94 82 71 41 162 72 
Ratio of acquitted 
persons in cases 
with public 
prosecution 
0.2 % 0.3 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.3 % 0.2 % 0.5 % 0.2 % 
Source: http://service.pravstat.kz 
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Kazakhstan made an attempt to develop its criminal justice system through 
introduction of jury trials. Although the amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code 
introducing the jury trials were made in 2001, they were actually implemented only in 
2007. This delay is an indirect evidence of resistance of the criminal justice professionals. 
As a result of this resistance, Kazakhstan chose continental form of jury trials (i.e. similar 
to France and Germany), where verdicts are produced by jurors together with judges. It is 
different from the American and Russian model, where verdicts are produced by jurors 
only, while judges only determine measure of punishment. Initially, the jury trial court in 
Kazakhstan consisted of 9 lay assessors and 2 professional judges (Law of RK of 2006 on 
the lay assessors “o prisiazhnykh zasedateliakh”). However, this format changed in 2009 
to its present form with 10 main and 2 substitute lay assessors as well as 1 professional 
judge after criminal justice system had ensured that having a single judge was sufficient 
to manage the jury trial. 
Currently, following the actual restriction of their jurisdiction in 2013 and their 
“fake” expansion in 2016, jury trials are requested by the defendants extremely rarely. As 
a result, the vast majority of criminal trials is conducted by a single judge. The Table 2 
provides information regarding the number of jury trials as well as their 
conviction/acquittal rates during the last decade. Overall, between 2007 and 2016, there 
have been 1,388 verdicts issued by jury courts regarding 2,079 defendants. This is quite 
small number, since it represents only about 0.5% of all verdicts (269,923) issued by 
criminal courts during this period. As it can be noticed, the acquittal rates for jury trials 
varied considerably since the introduction of this institution. The lowest acquittal rate 
 49 
 
2,5% was recorded in 2014, while the highest acquittal statistic 12,9 % was indicated in 
2009.  
Table 2. Outcomes of Jury Trials in Kazakhstan, 2007 – 2016 
Year 
Number of jury 
trials with 
issued verdicts 
Number 
of persons 
tried 
Number of 
convicted 
persons 
Number of 
acquitted 
persons 
Ratio 
 
 
2007 36 62 57 5 8,1 % 
2008 42 78 72 6 7,7 % 
2009 60 116 101 15 12,9 % 
2010 270 377 334 43 11,4 % 
2011 339 491 461 30 6,1 % 
2012 289 379 355 24 6,3 % 
2013 198 319 289 30 9,4 % 
2014 65 121 118 3 2,5 % 
2015 42 61 59 2 3,3 % 
2016 47 75 67 8 11,7 % 
Total 1,388 2,079 1,913 166  
Source: http://service.pravstat.kz 
 
In order to find out how ordinary and jury trials differ in terms of acquittal rates, I 
compared their statistics directly with each other. The Table 3 demonstrates the 
disparities in the proportion of acquitted persons in the all cases with public prosecution 
and cases specifically considered by juries. It should be mentioned that statistics 
regarding acquittal rates in cases with public prosecution already includes data of jury 
trial cases. Since in jury trials the presence of prosecutor is mandatory. So, the disparities 
in acquittal rates between all public prosecution cases and jury trial cases could be even 
higher, if we extract them one from another. According to the table, the acquittal rates in 
ordinary trials varied between 0.2% and 0.5% during 2009-2016 years, while the 
acquittal rate in jury trials were between 2.5 and 12.9%. So, the acquittal rates in jury 
trials have been very unusual for the criminal justice system in Kazakhstan - on average 
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25 times higher than in single judge trials during the 2009-2016 years. This clearly shows 
that jury trials reduce pro-accusation bias in criminal proceedings. 
Table 3. Differences in Acquittal Rates between Jury Trials and Single 
Judge Trials, 2009-2016 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Ratio of 
acquitted 
persons in 
all cases 
with public 
prosecution 
0,2 % 0,3 % 0,3 % 0,4 % 0,3 % 0,2 % 0,5 % 0,2 % 
Ratio of 
acquitted 
persons in 
jury trials 
12,9 % 11,4 % 6,1 % 6,3 % 9,4 % 2,5 % 3,3 % 11,7 % 
Source: http://service.pravstat.kz 
 
Furthermore, jury trials are conducted at particular places, which are called 
Specialized Interdistrict Criminal Courts that are located in 14 provincial centers and 
cities of Astana and Almaty. For crimes committed by military personnel and which are 
available for juries consideration there is a separate court that is called Republican 
Military court. Table 4 provides information about the distribution of jury trials across 
regions in Kazakhstan during the last ten years.  As it can be noticed the vast majority of 
trials occurred during the 2010-2013 years, which can be explained by the expansion of 
jurisdiction of jury trials that will be discussed later. Generally, over the ten years period 
the most number of trials have been conducted in Almaty city, Kostanay and Pavlodar 
regions, while the least number of trials have occurred in West Kazakhstan, North 
Kazakhstan and Kyzylorda regions. Also, the overall rare use of jury trials is well 
demonstrated through the following statistics. For instance, in 2008 in Akmola, West 
Kazakhstan, Karagandy, Pavlodar and North Kazakhstan regions there have not been jury 
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trials conducted at all. Similarly, if we take more recent court statistics, in 2015 in 
Astana, Aktobe, Atyrau, East Kazakhstan and West Kazakhstan regions there was no jury 
trials at all.  
Table 4. Distribution of Jury Trials in Kazakhstan, by Region, 2007 -
2016 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
2016 
 
Astana city 3 4 5 28 27 25 23 0 0 5 
Almaty city 4 4 3 30 54 40 10 5 3 n.d. 
Akmola region 1 0 3 19 24 18 20 8 5 n.d. 
Aktobe region 1 6 5 15 14 15 6 3 0 n.d. 
Almaty region 7 5 8 10 17 6 9 5 3 n.d. 
Atyrau region 6 5 5 12 11 7 2 2 0 n.d. 
East Kaz. 
region 4 4 1 16 16 9 6 3 0 n.d. 
Zhambyl region 1 2 5 19 7 13 6 1 1 n.d. 
West Kaz. 
region 2 0 0 7 15 11 11 7 0 n.d. 
Karagandy 
region 0 0 5 15 22 17 0 1 3 n.d. 
Kostanay 
region 0 2 1 23 34 35 16 5 7 n.d. 
Kyzylorda 
region 0 1 0 7 3 1 6 1 1 n.d. 
Mangistau 
region 3 3 7 13 7 7 3 1 1 n.d. 
Pavlodar region 0 0 3 30 59 45 36 14 3 n.d. 
North Kaz. 
region 3 0 0 3 10 11 17 1 3 n.d. 
South Kaz. 
region 1 6 9 22 17 16 14 8 12 n.d. 
Military court 0 0 0 1 2 0 5 0 0 n.d. 
Total 36 42 60 270 339 276 190 65 42 47 
Source: http://service.pravstat.kz 
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As it can be noticed from the Table 4 above, the number of jury trials varied 
considerably during the last decade. The primary reason for that is the fact that categories 
of cases available for juries’ consideration have experienced significant changes during 
that period. Generally, the process of changing the list of crimes that are eligible for jury 
trials could be divided into four stages of expansion and reduction. During first stage, 
between 2007 and 2010, only crimes that are punishable by life imprisonment or death 
penalty belonged to the competence of the jury trial courts. However, in 2010 the 
categories of crimes, could be decided by the juries have been expanded. Almost all 
grave crimes have become eligible for jury trials. As the number of jury trials increased, 
the acquittal rates have also increased. The participation of jurors in trials have 
demonstrated how weak and incompetent police investigation and prosecution agencies 
were in Kazakhstan. As a result, those agencies resisted against the further expansion of 
jury trials. As I explain in Chapter 5, in July of 2013 at the initiative of the General 
Prosecution Office the category of cases that can be subjected to jury trials have been 
reduced to its initial level (i.e. death penalty and life imprisonment cases). The “popular 
crimes” related to drug trafficking and corruption have been excluded from juries’ 
jurisdiction. Consequently, the number of jury trials returned to its initially low level.  
Official court statistics and jurisdictional changes leave the reader puzzled as to 
how and why jury trials drastically reduce pro-accusation bias, and how and why the 
criminal justice professionals resist these trials. The following chapters address these 
research questions drawing on the findings from my field research. 
 
  
 53 
 
Chapter 4. The Role of Jurors in Reducing the Accusation Bias in 
Kazakhstan 
 
This chapter is about how jury trials work in Kazakhstan. I focus here on the 
actual difference between single judge trials and jury trials in criminal proceedings in 
order to analyze how and why jury trials are able to reduce the accusation bias in 
Kazakhstan (Hypotheses 1-3). As the general purpose of the introduction of the jury trials 
in Kazakhstan was to provide better opportunities for both defense attorneys and 
prosecutors to compete with each other as well as improve the quality of investigation 
and protect better the rights of the defendants, and ultimately reduce the pro accusation 
bias in the courts (Sisenova 2015). 
H1: The Adversarial Procedure of Jury Trials Reduces the Accusation 
Bias 
 
According to the Kazakhstani Criminal Procedure Code, there is a little difference 
between ordinary trials and jury trials in terms of procedure. All the key stages such as 
testimonies of victims, suspects, witnesses as well as debates between the prosecutors and 
advocates could be found in both types of trials. Interviews with the key parties in the 
jury trial process such as prosecutors and defense attorneys helped me to identify each 
side’s opinion regarding the disparities in the ways ordinary and jury trials are conducted. 
Generally, prosecutors and judges do not make a difference between two types of trials in 
terms of adversariality of criminal proceedings. However, they indicate that the 
introduction of juries into the trial process, additionally requires strong public speaking 
skills from each party. On the other side, interviewed defense attorneys indicated that 
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jury trials certainly make the court hearings more adversarial. It is worth considering each 
party’s opinion separately. 
Defense counsel  
According to interviewed attorneys, there is a clear difference between the ways 
ordinary trials are conducted and the ways jury trials are performed. All the parties 
including judges, prosecutors and advocates behave differently in front of the jury trial 
court. To begin with, in jury trials the court hearings start exactly at the appointed time, 
while in ordinary trials it is a common practice that prosecutors or advocates may be late 
and hearings start 30 - 60 minutes or even later. This indicates judge’s leniency towards 
lateness of prosecutors, an early sign of the accusation bias. Next, in jury trials 
prosecution and defense sides try to present their arguments in a logical and coherent 
manner to make it understandable to the jurors, while in ordinary trials most of the times 
discussion of arguments and evidence is a mere formality because both judge and 
prosecutors have already reached the bargain about the outcome of the criminal trial. It is 
interesting to note how the Almaty-based attorney Daniyar Kanafin mentioned that when 
the first jury trial has been conducted in the city of Petropavl (North Kazakhstan) in 2007 
the prosecutors came to the trial in their special outfits, which they usually wore on 
public holidays. All observers were amazed how the trial was conducted: presiding judge 
interrupted the defense counsel only a few times - a sign of fair trial, and prosecutors 
have delivered brilliant speeches in front of the jury.  
Furthermore, interviewed attorneys explained to me that jury trials motivate both 
prosecutors and defense attorneys to come better prepared for trials. To be more precise, 
prosecutors understand that they cannot simply use their administrative resources and 
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explain informally to the judge all facts of the criminal case. Prosecutors cannot neglect 
the existence of the jury, they need to provide proper evidence and prepare strong 
arguments in order to persuade jurors that the defendant is guilty. Similarly, defense 
attorneys have great opportunity to impress the jury panel by their strong performances 
during debates, and, thus, gain the acquittal of the defendant of all charges. As for judges, 
they understand that trial process should be carefully conducted in accordance with 
regulation so that no criticism would be made of them in the future in appellate 
proceedings. One of the attorneys during the interviews revealed that in their criminal 
court there was a judge who often times showed up visibly drunk during the trials, 
everyone knew about his drinking habit, but no one could influence him. However, when 
this judge was appointed for jury trials, he always showed up for them sober.  
Furthermore, my participation in the training courses for attorneys to develop 
defense strategies in jury trials helped me understand the key techniques for advocates 
during participation in trials with lay assessors. The session was led by Nick Stanage, 
who presented “Ten golden rules” in order to win the support from juries. It worth 
mentioning each rule separately: 
Rule 1: Do not be boring. 
Why the defense should not be boring? Because juries need to be completely at under 
your spell. As if you have the power of magic and very discretely when you capture the 
attention of the jury, they find everybody else boring. I pray every night, before the jury 
trial: God, please give me a boring prosecutor, give me a boring judge and thirdly help 
me as an advocate. But first of all to the Lord I ask for a boring prosecutor who speaks in 
a boring way and listens to himself, not trying to connect with the juries. That is the kind 
of prosecutor I want, because it will enable to me to connect more directly with the juries. 
 
Rule 2: Communication means connection 
I take for granted, I assume that you know the detail of the evidence, you know your case 
concept, you prepared your questions for the witnesses, you know how to attack the 
prosecution’s evidence, all that we assumed. Now, when you are speaking to the jury, at 
any moment of the trial and especially at the end you have got to know how to connect, 
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you are not talking to the jury as if they were of low educational level or as if you are 
professional and they have to listen to you, because they are farmers and grandmothers. 
That is not a connection. You have got to do everything you can to emphasize that you 
have a close connection with them and when you use some sort of reference may be a 
proverb, poem or metaphor it has got to be something that they can connect with. The bar 
in Kazakhstan is national, so you can go anywhere. So, you have got to know that what 
works in Almaty might not work Ust-Kamenogorsk. When I am in front of the jury court 
in London, my speech is very different to the jury in north of England. Jurors in the North 
of England at weekends go to the mountains and they walk in the fields and everybody 
knows how sheep and cows look like. In London, they have to go to the Facebook to look 
at the mountains or a sheep, their life is totally different, and they use metro and 
department stores or visit the opera. If you talk about the opera in the North of England, 
they will kill you. Jurors would think that you are so superior that you know about the 
opera. So, you need to know what works in your local area, because you want to make 
sure, you are the one making best connection with the jury. 
 
Rule 3: The receiver is the most important person in any communication 
This is my favorite rule. What does it mean? You have to minimize the use of “I” in your 
speech, because it is the jury who is deciding the case, the jury which is analyzing the 
evidence, the jury that has the legal and moral responsibility to answer one question: 
“Has the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt?” During the last 20 
years I start my speech with these words: “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, what you 
have said at the beginning of the case is more important that anything I will say.” What 
juries say at the beginning of trial? They say: “I swear that I will faithfully try the 
defendant according to the evidence”. I remind to juries about their oath and say let’s 
see if I can help you to do that. My opinion does not matter, you are the only people in 
this court who matter. I hope I could help, let’s see what you think of the evidence. So, as 
you can notice what I am doing with juries is addressing them YOU, YOU, YOU instead 
of I, I, I. Forget about I, since I is the intruder, while YOU is the decision maker. Unless 
you cultivate this mentality, you will look like an arrogant professional who is failing to 
make connection with jury.  
 
Rule 4: Energy is the essential fuel 
Someone who lacks physical dynamism cannot impress the juries. Mental energy is also 
essential. When you are in front of the jury, from the first moment they see you, you need 
to have the mentality that there is nowhere I would rather be and it has to be true in your 
mind. If you have that mentality, you will be more persuasive, you make a connection, 
you show your physical and mental energy, and you are more likely to win the case for 
your client. 
 
Rule 5: Every time you speak to juries, give them something valuable 
The juries like prisoners; they were forced to come to the court. Some of them do not 
want to sit in the panel. You have got to be a person, giving them something valuable, not 
wasting their time by irrelevant detail. 
 
Rule 6: Make an eye contact 
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Look at each of the members of the jury court. Always at least look at one of them. The 
only exclusion is when you look at the judge.  
 
Rule 7: Authenticity  
You have to make sure that everything you said is authentic. Being a defense advocate is 
not about representing angels. Your job is not to say to the jury, the prosecution says that 
my client is the devil, while he is an angel. It is a fantasy. Your job as criminal defense 
advocate is to help juries to answer the question: Has the prosecution proved its case 
beyond the reasonable doubt? 
 
Rule 8: Be a trustworthy 
You have got to be reliable. Help juries to trust you. Say things that are reasonable. 
Persuade them in a way that is sensible, which shows that you also the member of the 
human race, not the professional lawyer race. Be tidy, be organized, be polite, and be 
helpful. 
 
Rule 9: Slow down 
When you are at the early stage of friendship with someone, you are not in a race of 
telling as much as possible about something about you that they may find interesting. 
Similarly with juries you should not hurry up with your speech, you have to speak in a 
slow and memorable manner. I want you to cultivate a mentality that you are on a date 
with each member of the jury during the trials. However, you should not have any 
personal contact with juries, do not even smile at them in the corridor or in the street.  
 
Rule 10: Choose your favorite communicator 
Choose a person who makes you listen very carefully and persuades you. Think about 
how this person can achieve such a result. Try to apply all the qualities and skills of this 
person on yourself. 
 
As it can be noticed from the recommendations mentioned above, the defense 
attorneys have to pay great attention to the juries, they need to not only work on the 
quality of their arguments and evidences, but also they need to develop their socio-
analytical skills in order to establish contact with juries and persuade them. Obviously, in 
the single judge trials defense attorneys do not have such opportunity, that is why from 
the defense perspective, the jury trials are more adversarial than ordinary trials in a way 
that they provide a greater chance for defense attorneys of winning the case due to 
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additional twelve people who preside in the court compared to trials where judge sits 
alone. 
Prosecutors 
As far as prosecutors’ opinion is concerned, they do not make distinction between 
ordinary and jury trials in terms of procedural norms. However they indicate that 
participation in trials with lay assessors requires some practice and knowledge. 
Interviews with prosecutors helped me identify their strategies in jury trials. According to 
the prosecutors, the quality of the preliminary investigation work done by police directly 
influence on the quality of arguments presented by prosecutors in the court. Since the 
weak evidence can be doubted and questioned, consequently defense attorneys can 
capitalize on that and win the support from the juries. As a result, poorly described 
actions of the defendant can lead to the changing of the qualification of the crime by jury 
court or even worse to the acquittal verdict. It means that in the eyes of the jury the 
prosecutor failed to prove the guilt of the defendant and made a mistake, which, in turn, 
indicates a low professional level of the prosecutor.  
Also, prosecutors told me that an ability to persuade juries without exaggeration 
of the threat of the crime was not an easy task. The prosecutor needs to have a creative 
mind as well as deep awareness of the theory of methodological analysis. The only 
knowledge of the dispositions of the articles from the Criminal code does not allow 
uncovering the essence of human interactions. At least, prosecutor needs to know how 
internal consciousness is formed and how the internal contradictions of the person are 
revealed. This knowledge helps to detect the reasons and motives for committing crimes 
as well as prevent public relations from any criminal infringements. Prosecutors 
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acknowledge that not all of their colleagues have such a deep understanding of critical 
reasoning. Prosecutor 1 described the accusation speech of one of his young partners in 
the case regarding drugs:  
“the state must detect, prevent and harshly punish those who make a profit from 
the troubles of others. The punishment for drug dealers should be as strict as for 
murderers. This is because, if a murderer kill one or two people, the drug dealer 
kills a million of people at once”. This speech explicitly illustrates the weakness 
of prosecutor, since he made a fatal error by saying that “drug dealer kills a 
million of peoples at once”. There is no such a statistic it is only his fantasy. By 
saying such words, he digressed from the alleged accusations. Regarding the fact 
that the “state must detect, prevent and harshly punish those who make a profit 
on the troubles of others” these words do not represent the position of the 
government. The state does not make a purpose to harshly punish guilty persons, 
instead the purpose of the criminal law is described in the article 2 of the 
Criminal code: “protection of rights, liberties, and legitimate interests of 
individuals and citizens, of property, rights, and legitimate interests of 
organizations, of public order and safety, of the environment, constitutional order 
and territorial integrity of the Republic of Kazakhstan, of public and state 
interests protected by law from criminal infringements, protection of peace and 
safety of mankind, as well as crime prevention.” (Anonymous. 2017. Interview 
with the prosecutor by author. February 17) 
 
This particular example demonstrates what problems current prosecution office s 
experiences. Many young prosecutors need to learn about making convincing arguments 
through training courses and manuals.  
Furthermore, prosecutors warn to be careful with the concept of “public 
prosecution.” Since, when juries hear this term they momentarily think about power of 
the state, while unlawful acts of the defendant goes into the shadow. Prosecutors indicate 
that their purpose in jury trials is to present evidence in the simple understandable 
language. This is because it will help juries to figure out the validity of the alleged 
accusation. The Prosecutor 2 describes how one defendant (the former educated lawyer) 
tried to demonstrate the judge’s prevention of the violations of the procedural rules as the 
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support of the accusation bias. He called the “fight” as the “incident”, “quarrel” as the 
“dispute.” Obviously, this was influencing the juries because jurors were subconsciously 
acquiring invalid information in favor of the defendant, which could possibly have 
impact on their decision-making. Therefore prosecutor asked questions from the 
defendant regarding the distinctions between the real terms mentioned in the accusation 
and the ones defendant proposed to juries. By doing this prosecutor demonstrated to 
juries that the defendant was misguiding them. (Anonymous. 2017. Interview with the 
prosecutor by author. February 21) 
Prosecutor 3 described his experience in the participation of jury trial regarding 
the defendant who had been accused of killing his own sister: 
The difficulty of the case was that the victim in the trial was the father of the 
defendant. During the jury selection process I and my colleague tried to form the 
panel consisting of women of young age preferably under the age 35. This is 
because the victim was the young woman, and also because the persons of same 
gender tend to reach solidarity and follow the opinion of the leader. As a result, 
the selected panel consisted of 11 women and 1 man. As according to the law on 
lay assessors the panel should consist of 10 main and 2 substitute juries. During 
the trial the defense side presented their key witness. However, by analyzing the 
mimics of the witness it was clear that she was lying, so by asking relevant 
questions prosecutors exposed to the jury the true nature of the witness. 
Gradually, the father of the defendant, who was also the victim in the trial started 
to believe us. At the end of trial he was already asking his son to admit the murder 
of the sister. (Anonymous. 2017. Interview with the prosecutor by author. March 
3) 
 
So, it can be noticed that jury selection process plays important role in the trials, 
since from the beginning parties get acknowledged with future lay participants as well as 
have chances for peremptory challenges. In addition, prosecutor mentioned that in both 
jury and ordinal trial it is important to trace the verbal signals of witnesses and even the 
timbre of their voices. Since it helps to identify the trustworthiness of their testimonies. 
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Participant observation 
In order to find out whether claims about the fair competition between defense 
attorneys and prosecutors at the jury trial were true, I attended the actual jury court trial 
in the Astana Interdistrict criminal court. The defendant Khadarov had two experienced 
attorneys: Yerzhanova and Bilyalov. Attorney Yerzhanova who back in 2011 at the jury 
trial regarding Minister of Public Health Doskaliev defended his accomplice Dyuisaliev 
and eventually the jury acquitted her client. While attorney Bilyalov was known for 
defending the victim in the criminal case regarding the murder of a student Aubakirov in 
2016. On the other side, the prosecutor was a young captain Khoshiev, Attorney 
Sagyntayev represented the victim – a mother of the killed person. The process started 
with the jury selection procedure, many candidates have been eliminated due to various 
reasons: old age, busy work schedule, little children at home, etc. As a result 19 people 
left in the courtroom. Their names have been put on the basket and judge extracted from 
it two pieces of paper with names of persons who have been released from jury duty and 
sent home. So, 17 people left in the courtroom, judge asked prosecutor and defense 
attorneys to exercise their right of peremptory challenge. The prosecutor named two 
persons that have been eliminated from the jury duty: they were males of around 50 years 
old and probably upper middle level social status. While defense attorneys eliminated 
three individuals: one young man and two women. I did not detect any manipulation 
during the jury selection process. 
The whole trial in this case lasted for 14 sessions during the 16 days period. The 
defendant Khadarov was initially charged with murder and deliberate infliction of serious 
harm to health However, during the trial the prosecutor changed the qualification of the 
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crime to murder committed in a state of a strong sudden mental disturbance and infliction 
of the serious harm to health in the state of heated passion. This change would result in 
the lesser punishment of the defendant, if convicted. According to the evidence provided, 
there was a conflict between the two young individuals, who then set the meeting in the 
suburbs of the Astana city. One individual Galyuautdinov brought with himself around 
30 individuals to the meeting, while other one Khadarov brought with himself his father, 
two brothers-friends and their father. When two parties arrived at the place of meeting, 
parents tried to establish rapport with other side and find resolution to the conflict, 
however opposite side did not communicate at all, instead they attacked Khadarov’s side 
and fired at them from traumatic pistols and injured Khadarov’s father. Khadarov, tried to 
defend his father and has taken the gun from the backseat of his car and started to shoot 
all over the place. As a result, victim Lobanov was killed and 5 other individuals injured.  
The contest between prosecutor and defense attorneys become clear during the 
testimonies of witnesses and victims as well as their cross examination. Prosecutor was 
asking the victims whether they had previously abused Khadarov in order to stress out 
that there had been no grounds for Khadarov to kill Lobanov and injure the others. While, 
the position of defense attorneys was to point out that the Khadarov’s side did not want 
any violence. They cited the fact that Khadarov’s side had brought their fathers, who 
attempted to establish a dialog by asking the opposite side to mediate the dispute, as 
evidence of peaceful motives of the defendant. Furthermore, according to the Criminal 
Procedure Code, the judge and other parties should not mention any information 
regarding the previous convictions of the defendant or his bad habits, illnesses and other 
factors that could provoke the bias in juries. However, during the trials, the previous 
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conviction of the Khadarov (i.e. he was previously put under the probation for this 
particular crime, however the verdict has been overturned and the case was send for the 
consideration of jury court) has been widely mentioned by prosecutor and victims, even 
though the judge each time stopped prosecutor and victims and was asking juries to not 
consider the fact of previous conviction. It was obvious that jurors have learned about 
previous conviction of the defendant.  
Next, I had a feeling during the trial that Judge had been slightly favoring 
prosecution. He several times overturned the motions of the defense attorneys, while he 
declined the motions of the prosecutor only once. I measured the duration of speeches of 
each side during the concluding discussion of the trial. The speech of prosecutor lasted 7 
minutes, victim’s attorney spoke for 12 minutes. On the other side, the defense attorney 
Yerzhanova’s speech lasted for 45 minutes, while defense attorney Bilyalov spoke for 15 
minutes. So, it was clear to me that both the jury trial allowed defense to speak freely and 
that the defense was better prepared. Defense attorneys were all the times appealing 
directly to the juries, while prosecutor often forgot to maintain any eye contact with 
jurors, instead, staring in the indictment.    
Overall, the participation in the jury trial left me with the controversial feelings. 
This is because the defense attorneys were active and trying to ask logical questions as 
well as to address their arguments directly to juries. While the prosecutor and the victim’s 
attorney have been passive and addressing their evidence and arguments mostly to the 
judge. Yet it was clear that this jury trial was a real contest between the defense and 
prosecution. 
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H2: The Jurors’ Attitude toward Decision-Making Reduces the 
Accusation Bias 
 
As the existing research demonstrates, the jurors’ attitudes toward deciding 
criminal cases is very different from those of professional judges. This argument is 
indirectly supported by official statistics regarding the acquittal rates. As I have explained 
above, in Kazakhstan, the acquittal rates in jury trials are much higher than those in 
ordinary trials. My interviews revealed that parties who have been involved in jury trials 
hold different opinions regarding this issue. Prosecutors and judges indicate that juries 
usually do not agree with the harsh punishments for certain crimes. For instance, between 
2010 and 2013, when criminal cases regarding drug trafficking were eligible to be 
decided by juries, many defendants have been given short prison sentences. This is 
because juries considered measures of punishment for drug-related crimes as too strict. 
On the other hand, according to the study conducted by LPRC (2016) almost all 
of advocates who participated in jury trials responded that the opinion of judge regarding 
the criminal case has an immense influence on the decision-making of juries. That is why 
the fairness of jury verdicts is highly doubted by advocates. 53% of respondents were not 
satisfied and 17% were partially satisfied with the current practices of jury trials. The 
most popular reason for the advocates’ dissatisfaction are the concerns regarding the 
influence and pressure on juries by presiding judge. Therefore, 9 out of 10 attorneys did 
not support joint decision-making by judges and juries. It means that attorneys believe 
that juries and judges should not discuss the verdicts together. 
Furthermore, attorney Almira Shaikhina shares her experience in participation in 
the trial regarding the judges of the Supreme Court Dzhakishev and Tashenova in 2012, 
who had been accused of corruption. According to the advocate judges deliberately chose 
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to be tried by jury court, since they believed for a more fair trial. However it went wrong, 
as Shaikhina indicates that during the trial jurors have been influenced by the social 
factor. To be more precise, the panel of juries consisted from low-income employees of 
public sector. Therefore, prosecutor each time stressed on the supposedly luxurious 
lifestyle of the defendants. He several time contrasted the vacations of defendants to the 
foreign countries with the inability of the jurors to make similar trips abroad. The defense 
attorney rebutted that the salary of Supreme Court judges, were much higher compared to 
the average wage in the Kazakhstan, therefore, defendant could afford such trips. 
However, juries have been influenced by these disparities in the incomes, thus they 
convicted the judges, according to Shaikhina. (Almira Shaikhina.2017. Telephone call to 
author, March 27) 
The general knowledge is that jurors unlike judges are independent from any 
authorities, they are not bureaucrats and do not have any obligations except to make 
judgments in the cases, according to their beliefs and consciousness. Therefore, such 
attitude of jurors toward the trial contributes to the greater acquittal rates. Interviews with 
jurors enabled me to confirm that they do care about the outcome of criminal 
proceedings. 
 Juror 1 describes how she has overcome the difficulty of considering the case 
“There were three defendants on trial; all of them young individuals aged 28, 26 
and 22 respectively. My son is 22 years old, so I did put him in the place of 
defendant, and I was horrified. How is that possible that these individuals 
committed such a severe crime? They murdered the human! However, initial 
feelings have gone away as the prosecutors and defense attorneys presented their 
evidence, and witnesses provided their testimonies. I tried to stay calm and 
evaluate all the arguments, because the lives of individuals have been put on the 
trial.” (Anonymous. 2016. Interview with the juror by author. December 27) 
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Juror 2 tells how she learned that prosecutor has wrongfully qualified the crime 
“…the defendant was accused of murder, however the testimonies of victims and 
witnesses during the trial, which have been partially contradicting their initial 
testimonies provided to the investigator as well as reports of psychological 
experts have proven that defendant did not control himself during committing 
crime. Victims have been hugely outnumbering the defendant, what is more they 
were shooting, they injured his father and they were beating him, obviously he 
was frightened and could not control himself, therefore he could not adequately 
evaluate his actions. Even without the forensic examination reports it was clear to 
me that he lost his mind at the moment of attack and killed accidently the bullying 
guy.” (Anonymous. 2017. Interview with the juror by author. January 12) 
 
Juror 3 describes how the jury convicted the defendant to 11 years of imprisonment 
“The defendant has been transferring about 0.8 kg of narcotics under his clothes 
during the travel on the train from Kazakhstan to Russia, when he was captured 
by Kazakhstani Custom officers. Even though he denied the allegations, it become 
clear that he was lying, since prosecutors provided explicit evidence.” 
(Anonymous. 2017. Interview with the juror by author. February 2) 
 
Juror 4 describes how they acquitted the defendant because of the weak evidence 
provided  
“The defendant was accused of selling drugs, however the prosecutors failed to 
prove that the former was really guilty. No video or audio recordings have been 
made that would have exposed the defendant. Also, witnesses did not directly see 
how the defendant was selling the drugs, they only saw buyer who told them that 
he bought the drugs from the defendant. Therefore, we decided that the 
allegations proposed in regards to defendant are not justified, thus, we acquitted 
him.” (Anonymous. 2017. Interview with the juror by author. March 5) 
 
 
Juror 5 describes how the jury trial influenced him to change his profession 
“I was a lawyer at the corporate sector with almost ten years of experience, when 
I received the invitation to the court to the jury selection process. To be honest, I 
was really surprised since I did not expect at all to be chosen. There have only 
small number of people arrived for the selection process and majority of them 
wanted to escape the jury duty. When judge asked whether among juries there are 
any attorneys, I responded that I am a corporate lawyer. The judge said to me 
that it is very good, and that the jury panel needs such people as me. So, we were 
considering the case regarding the murder on the aggravated circumstances. The 
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defendant was accused of murdering old woman and her grandson and robbing 
their house. The evidences provided by prosecutors were enough to prove that the 
defendant was really guilty. Interestingly, what I noticed was how emotional were 
the jurors around me, they cried when they heard the testimonies of the victim 
side and witnesses. Also, the defense lawyer was not prepared good enough 
compared to the prosecutor. In the deliberation room, we unanimously convicted 
the defendant to 17 years of imprisonment. The most interesting things happened 
after the trial, I had friends among attorneys’ community who were inviting to 
join this profession before, however the exposure to the real trial process inspired 
me. I have greatly become interested in the criminal processes and all the stuff 
that is related to trial processes. After one year I started to participate in 
attorneys trainings and just recently I have applied for the attorney license. I hope 
that I would find ways to defend the rights of my clients effectively. (Anonymous. 
2017. Interview with the juror by author. March 17) 
 
The jurors 6 and 7 have explicitly expressed their regret regarding convicting the 
defendant. According to them during the process the prosecutor and victim failed to 
provide sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the defendant. However the judge has 
forced the members of the jury to convict the defendant. The stories of these juries are 
explicitly described in the analysis of evidence for hypothesis 6 below in Chapter 5.  
It should be mentioned that although juries acquit more often than judges alone, 
the general public is not eager to serve on the jury panel. My in-depth analysis of over 
300 hundred jury trial verdicts shows that the average turnout rate during the jury 
selection process is only about 25-30%. So, most of the people ignore their civic duty to 
participate in trials, and the state agents do not seem to care about it, thus, passively 
resisting the jury trial courts. Furthermore, during my participant observation of a jury 
trial in Astana in February 2017, only 40 individuals out of 300 candidates came to the 
court for selection procedures. What is more, almost all of them did not want to 
participate in trial. They provided different reasons for excuses. However, judge 
reluctantly repeated several times that participation in jury trials was the duty of 
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Kazakhstani citizens and avoidance would bring significant penalties. So, the question for 
future research emerges: if people become jurors without desire or under the pressure of 
penalties can they produce fair and impartial verdicts or do they simply want to quickly 
finish the trial? My interview with jurors indicated that many of them felt in a 
discriminated position: they considered the judge not as an equal to them, but as the boss 
whose opinion was more important than opinion of jurors during the jury deliberation of 
the verdict. Also, there are no requirements for juries in terms of education or 
qualifications. So, less educated and young jurors in the Kazakhstani context can follow 
the personal opinion of the judge regarding the verdict.  
 Furthermore, the juries definitely reduce accusation bias compared to single-judge 
trials. Table 5 provides information regarding disparities in outcomes between jury and 
ordinary trials in deciding murder cases. In murder trials, the acquittal rates in jury trials 
have been on average 50 times higher than in ordinary trials. It is interesting to note that 
while the acquittal rates for murder cases in ordinary trials during the 2010-2016 have 
been around 0–0.3%, the same statistics for jury trials varied considerably. The general 
trend with jury trials is that the acquittal rates have been decreasing over the years. In 
2010, it has been the highest with 12.5% and by 2016 it was only 2.8%. 
 More evidence of difference in judge-juries decision-making could be 
demonstrated through the analysis of trials for drug-related crimes. Table 6 illustrates the 
disparities in outcomes between jury and ordinary trials in deciding drug related cases. As 
it can be noticed the disparities in this type of crime are even higher than in murder cases. 
The percentage of acquitted persons in jury trials were on average 60 times higher than in 
ordinary trials. 
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Table 5. The Disparities in Outcomes between Jury and Ordinary Trials 
in Deciding Murder Cases (Article 99 of the Criminal Code) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total number of persons tried 
for murder  
1,154 1,162 1,107 1,140 897 449 703 
Including persons tried in single 
judge trials 
1,026 991 977 1,015 830 432 667 
Number of convicted persons in 
single judge trials 
1,025 991 975 1,014 830 432 665 
Percentage of convicted  99.9% 100 99.8 99.9 100 100 99.7 
Number of acquitted persons in 
single judge trials 
1 0 2 1 0 0 2 
Percentage of acquitted  0.1 % 0  0.2 0.1 0 0 0.3 
Including persons tried in jury 
trials 
128 171 130 125 67 17 36 
Number of convicted persons in 
jury trials 
112 158 118 116 65 17 35 
Percentage of convicted  87.5% 92.4 90.8  92.8 97 100 97.2 
Number of acquitted persons in 
jury trials 
16 13 12 9 2 0 1 
Percentage of acquitted  12.5% 7.6 9.2 7.2 3 0 2.8 
Sources: http://service.pravstat.kz, Official response from the Committee of Legal 
statistics to my request  
 
Not only do juries acquit the persons on a higher rate, but they also lighten up the 
punishments by changing accusations from severe crimes to the moderate ones. The 
article 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code allows changing the qualification of the 
crime during the trial. The Table 7 provides information about the criminal cases when 
juries changed the qualifications of crimes. Between 2007 and 2016 on 111 occasions 
juries issued verdicts after having lessened the criminal charges, thus, sentencing the 
defendants to less severe criminal punishment criminal charges. These lessened criminal 
charges would not be eligible to be heard by the jury, if they were brought to court 
originally. This represents about 10% of overall cases considered by juries during this  
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Table 6. The Disparities in Outcomes between Jury and Ordinary Trials 
in Deciding Drug Related Cases (Articles 259-261 of the Criminal Code) 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total number of persons tried 
regarding the narcotics crimes 
6,043 2,256 1,802 1,622 
Including persons tried in single 
judge trials 
5,900 2,109 1,683 1,530 
Number of convicted persons in 
single judge trials 
5,899 2,099 1,676 1,528 
Percentage of convicted 99.98 % 99.5% 99.6% 99.9% 
Number of acquitted persons in 
single judge trials 
1 10 7 5 
Percentage of acquitted 0.02% 0.5% 0.4% 0.1% 
Including persons tried in jury 
trials 
143 147 119 92 
Number of convicted persons in 
jury trials 
123 137 115 80 
Percentage of convicted 86% 93.2% 96.6% 87% 
Number of acquitted persons in 
jury trials 
20 10 4 12 
Percentage of acquitted 14% 6.8% 3.4% 13% 
Sources: http://service.pravstat.kz, Official response from the Committee of Legal 
statistics to the request of author. 
 
 
period. It follows that juries have a well-developed collective legal consciousness 
because jurors do not simply rubber-stamp the cases within the framework of 
prosecutor’s accusation; they can change the proposed charges to the different crimes 
when issuing verdicts. 
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Table 7. Verdicts by Jury Trials, in Which Juries Changed Criminal 
Charges, in Kazakhstan, 2007-2016 
Article of 
Criminal 
Code in 
editions 
Type of crime Verdicts issued regarding each particular crime in years 
16 
July 
1997 
3 
July 
2014 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
98 101 Murder committed 
in a state of a 
strong sudden 
mental disturbance 
- - - - 1 2 - - - - 3 
99 102 Murder as a result 
of exceeding limits 
of necessary self-
defense 
- - - - 6 9 3 2 - - 20 
101 104 Causing Death by 
Negligence 
- - - - 2 2 1 2 - - 7 
103 106 Deliberate 
Infliction of 
serious harm to 
health 
- - - - 15 11 8 5 - - 39 
108 111 The Infliction of 
harm to health in 
the heat of passion 
- - - - 1 - - - - - 1 
109 112 The Infliction of 
serious harm to 
health when 
exceeding the 
limits of necessary 
defense 
- - - - - 1 1 - - - 2 
111 114 Incautious 
infliction of harm 
to health 
- - - - - - - 1 - - 1 
112 115 Threats - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 
122 122 Sexual relationship 
or other actions of 
sexual nature with 
person, not 
reached the age of 
sixteen  
- - - - - - 1 - - - 1 
123 123 Coercion to sexual 
intercourse, 
pederasty, 
lesbianism or other 
sexual actions 
- - - - - 1 - - - - 1 
124 124 Depravation of 
minors  
 
- - - - - 1 - - - - 1 
175 188 Theft - - - - 1 1 - 1 - - 3 
176 189 Conversion or - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 
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Embezzlement of 
entrusted other 
people's property 
177 190 Fraud - - - - 2 - 1 - - - 3 
178 191 Robbery - - - - 2 2 1 - - - 5 
185 200 Illegal Taking 
Possession of an 
Automobile or 
Other Transport 
Vehicle without 
the Purpose of 
Stealing 
- - - - - - 1 - - - 1 
251 287 Illegal Purchase, 
Transfer, Sale, 
Storage, 
Transportation, or 
the Carrying of 
Weapons, 
Ammunition, 
Explosives, or 
Explosion Devices 
- - - - 1 1 - - - - 2 
257 293 Hooliganism - - 1 - 1 3 - 2 - - 7 
262 300 The illegal 
cultivation of 
plants, prohibited 
to cultivation and 
contained drugs 
- - - - 1 - - - - - 1 
296 345 Violation of traffic 
regulations and the 
operation of 
transport facilities 
by the persons who 
operate the 
transport facilities 
- - - - - - - 1 - - 1 
307 361 Abuse of official 
powers 
- - - - 1 1 - - - - 2 
327 389 Arbitrariness - - - - 4 1 - - - - 5 
364 434 Failure to report 
about the crime 
- - - - 1 1 - - - - 2 
  Other - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 
 111 
Sources: http://service.pravstat.kz, Official response from the Committee of Legal 
statistics to the request of author 
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H3: Jurors Reduce Accusation Bias by Breaking Informal Bargaining 
Between Judges and Prosecutors                                         
 
All attorneys, whom I have interviewed, insisted that there is a strong informal 
relationship of cooperation and coordination between judges in criminal courts and 
prosecutors. This cooperation and coordination is usually maintained for two purposes. 
Firstly, to reach the consensus on the sentence and the level of punishment in the criminal 
case in order to exclude any possibilities of overturning the decisions by appellate courts 
in the future. Kazakhstani Criminal Procedure Code allows unlimited appeals against 
acquittals, and prosecutors use it with vigor against the judges who sometimes disagree 
with prosecutors. Secondly, to discuss the matters of lightening up or instead toughen the 
punishment as well as producing the acquittal or conviction verdict for the defendant, if 
there have certain amount of bribe been offered by either defense or the victim. So, the 
introduction of juries into the trial process interrupts the bargaining between judges and 
prosecutors in a way that it becomes more difficult to negotiate directly the outcome of 
the case. The third party “jurors” is considered as the outsiders of the judicial system, 
meaning that it is difficult to integrate them into the well-established informal relation 
because none of state agents can guarantee cooperation of jurors in the corrupt deals in 
the criminal proceedings. Consequently, the trials with participation of juries increase the 
probability of producing the acquittal verdicts. 
These problems of Kazakhstani criminal justice system have been well described 
by popular attorney Jokhar Utebekov. According to him, there is a lack of 
professionalism among investigators, they often times provide weak evidence and 
physically or psychologically force suspects to make confessions about committing of 
crimes. Next, the prosecution office in the country possesses enormous power, which 
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literally means that prosecutors can appeal and consequently overturn almost any court’s 
decisions. In addition, the Kazakhstani judges are not independent in their decision-
making; they are highly vulnerable if they do not match the numerical evaluation criteria. 
To be more precise, it is safer for judges to convict, since if they acquit suspects, then 
higher court instances may cancel their decisions. Consequently, three cancellations of 
sentences by the courts of higher instances may put an end to the career of a judge 
(Jokhar Utebekov 2016. Interview with the author. December 29) 
All these are problems, according to attorneys, and they result in the emergence of 
informal relationship between the Prosecutors and Judges. It is when they mutually 
decide beforehand the outcome of the case. Consequently, when prosecutors bring the 
cases to the court, judges approve all the allegations and convict defendants. As a result 
our judicial system experiences very strong accusation bias. This phenomenon could be 
partially explained by the Soviet legacy. Most of the former USSR states experience the 
similar problem in their judiciary systems. The centralized communist system left huge 
footprints on the governance strategies of all its former member states, including the 
judicial area (Trochev 2014). 
During my participant observation of previously mentioned the jury trial of 
Khadarov, prosecutor during the trial has suddenly changed the initial accusation murder 
to the less severe charge, that is murder committed in the state of affection. Both the 
victim’s attorney and victim herself were shocked with such decision; they openly 
accused the prosecutor and the judge of the corruption during the breaks between the trial 
sessions. They argued that there were no grounds for change the accusation from the 
crime that is punishable by 15-20 years of imprisonment to the crime that is punishable 
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by no more than 5 years of imprisonment. Victim believed that defense had offered the 
bribe to the prosecutor and judge in order to lessen the punishment. So, in Kazakhstani 
legal practices juries do not fully stop the informal relationship, since there is a still room 
for the negotiation between the judge and prosecutor, both whom retain a great deal of 
discretion. 
In conclusion, jury trials dramatically change acquittal/conviction rates in 
criminal cases as well as makes the processes of jury trials more adversarial. This is why 
law-enforcement agencies have been resisting against jury trials. I turn to the repertoires 
of resistance in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5. Resistance of Law-Enforcement Agencies against Jury Trials 
in Kazakhstan 
 
This chapter examines the nature, mechanisms and practices of resistance against 
jury trials in Kazakhstan based on my own interview data, analysis of media stories, court 
statistics and legislative changes. There have been many attempts at making Kazakhstani 
criminal trials fairer. But many of them failed. However, the jury trials succeeded, as 
evident by their unusually high acquittal rates resulting from both adversarial procedure, 
juror attitudes and reduced informality. And it is for this reason, they have been resisted 
by most criminal justice professionals. As I show below, this resistance takes places both 
openly and secretly, formally and informally, and at the national and local levels. 
H4: Criminal Justice Professionals Resist by Portraying Jurors to the 
Public as Unprofessional and Emotional Individuals Unable to Assess 
Evidence and Deliver Fair Verdicts 
 
The various sociological surveys conducted prior to the introduction of jury trials 
in 2007 have indicated disparities in the opinions of ordinary citizens toward the 
institution of juries. Although the majority of 2336 respondents (51.1%) supported the 
introduction of jury trials, there have been those who were against its implementation 
(21.9%) and those who hesitated to describe their position regarding jury trials (27%). 
Even more competitive was the opinion of people regarding the type of jury trials, with 
26.6% respondents voting for continental model (i.e. when juries and judge mutually 
decide the verdict and measure of punishment), 25.2% of individuals made a preference 
for classical model (i.e. when juries determine the verdict, while judge only decide the 
measure of punishment) and smaller fraction of respondents (16.2%) desired the soviet 
model of lay assessors. At the same time, majority of individuals expressed their doubts 
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regarding the effectiveness of jury trials in the Kazakhstani context due to the low status 
of human rights in the country (Suleimenova 2009). Similarly to general public, there is 
no consensus among law enforcement agencies regarding their attitude toward the jury 
institution. Although the majority is against, there is still minority group who supports the 
development of jury trial courts. The content analysis of public speeches of legal officials 
as well as interviews with judges and prosecutors helped me to identify their positions 
regarding the jury trials.  
To begin with, in July 2013, when the jurisdiction of jury trials have been 
curtailed, the Deputy General Prosecutor of Kazakhstan Mr. Merkel announced the 
reduction of the category of cases that are available for juries consideration, the main 
argument was that in the Kazakhstani context it is difficult to select the impartial jury 
panel since there is a very high level of blood ties among ordinary citizens. Although jury 
trials are conducted in the centers of a province, in which crimes have been committed, it 
is difficult to believe how jury panel could be comprised from the individuals who to 
certain extent connected with the defendant. Mr. Merkel, indeed, chose not to mention 
any specific trial.  
Furthermore, during the interviews with judges they described that juries are 
experiencing difficulties when considering crimes, which are committed by organized 
groups. There have been cases when murders have been committed by criminal gangs, 
however only person who directly killed the victim have been convicted, while other 
accomplices escaped the punishment. Judges argue that juries usually do not understand 
the concept of organized criminal group, which implies, in judges’ opinions, that all 
individuals who are involved in such entities are responsible for committed crimes. 
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However, it might also be the case that prosecutors on those occasions failed to provide 
strong evidence to prove the formation of organized criminal groups 
The former Procurator-General Askhat Daulbayev publicly blamed the acquittal 
verdict issued by jury court in 2010 regarding the Botabayev: 
“In 2011, the jury trial court of Astana acquitted the suspect Botabayev, 
who was accused of murder. All the appeals from the prosecution office 
have been declined. In the aftermath, he becomes involved in the extremist 
group, which murdered 11 people in Ile-Alatau National park in 2011. He 
is currently on the run and nobody from among judges have been punished 
for this.” (Kursiv.kz 2013) 
 
Although Askhat Daulbayev did not particularly blame the juries for that verdict, 
it was clear that this argument was supposed to undermine the image of jury institution. 
In another news report it was indicated that prosecutor who has taken part in this trial 
appealed to the cassation court, where he mentioned that the suspect Botabayev and 
witnesses lied to the juries that at the moment of crime they have been in another city, 
also they persuaded juries that he is a religious person and that he could not kill a human 
being. However, prosecutor indicated that during the investigation the radical Islamic 
literature has been found in the house of suspect (Tengrinews.kz 2013) 
When President Nazarbayev has learned this case, he ordered Beknazarov 
(Chairman of the Supreme Court at that time) to conduct “thorough investigation” on 
cases where the criminals have been acquitted by courts. Beknazarov made an 
investigation regarding this particular case and backed the decision of the court. 
According to the head of Supreme Court: 
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“The Investigation and Prosecution services failed to provide enough evidence in 
order to convict the suspect that is why Botabayev was acquitted and released 
from jail” (Nomad.su 2013) 
 
However, the opinion of Beknazarov has not been shared by some of his 
colleagues. For instance, the Head of Judicial Union of Kazakhstan Anatolii Smolin 
indicated that juries could be easily manipulated by defense counsel: 
“Surely, in the current realities it is difficult to for all the parties of trial process 
to abide the ethical norms. However, it is important to understand that the way 
parties of trial behave significantly influence the outcome of the criminal case. 
This is especially true, when it comes to jury trials, where attorney can effectively 
demonstrate all his public speaking skills. For instance, in the case of Botabayev 
who had been accused of murder, the defense counsel found a way to persuade 
members of the jury that his client was not guilty.” (Tengrinews.kz 2013) 
 
However, due to new facts and evidences the acquittal verdict regarding 
Botabayev has been overturned by appellate court, and the case was sent for 
consideration by another judge and new jury panel, which convicted the defendant in 
absentia. 
So, this case demonstrates the negative attitude of Prosecution office towards 
acquittals and the jury institution. As for judges, there is no consensus among them 
regarding the jury practices, since chair of Supreme Court justified the acquittal verdict 
by weak evidences provided by investigation and prosecution offices, while the Head of 
Judicial Union of Kazakhstan blamed attorneys for misguiding the juries.  
Kairat Mami, the current chair of the Supreme Court, publicly supported the jury 
trials on several occasions. For example, in September 2016 during the Internet 
conference he stressed the importance of jury trials for Kazakhstani community: 
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“I think that the jury institution should exist in Kazakhstan. I agree that jury 
institution should develop. I was one of the initiators of introduction of jury trials 
back in 2007. There were many opponents of this institution from the 
Investigation, Prosecution and National Security Committee at that time. They 
thought that juries would acquit everyone. 
 
The main advantage of juries is that the people themselves take part in the 
administration of justice. Why do you think that we are not interested in jury 
trials? Actually jury trials would eliminate many questions to the courts. Also, I 
think that the limitation of criminal cases that are available for juries 
consideration in 2013 was a wrong act. That is why we expanded the jurisdiction 
of jury trials last year [2015], we added 5 articles to the jurisdiction of juries. 
However, these additional crimes are rarely happen. I am for the further 
expansion of jury trials. Of course, there could be errors made by jury court, 
since they are not professionally trained, but they judge according to their life 
experience. So, if the evidence provided by prosecutors are weak it is better for 
juries to acquit the defendants. We would make further expansion of jury trials, 
but I want to emphasize that we already have some progress, in the first 8 months 
of 2016 there were 34 jury trials, while in 2015 during similar period we had only 
28 cases. I want to point out that that the initiative should be also from the 
defendants and their attorneys, since according to the law, they should request 
jury trials. We would develop the jury institution together with advocates’ 
community.” (Zakon.kz 2016) 
 
Another supporter of jury trials within judicial community is Head of Mangistau 
Interdistrict Criminal Court Azat Izbassarov, who in his recent interview indicated the 
need for the further expansion of jury trials through including into the competence of 
juries all the severe crimes.  
“…the expansion of jury trials should be done for following reasons, firstly I think 
that the participation of ordinary people in the administration of justice as lay 
assessors will increase the trust toward the judicial power. Secondly, such 
expansion could possibly protect the rights and legal interests of individuals who 
have been accused of severe crimes. I personally think that jury trials can be 
conducted regarding all severe criminal cases, which are punishable by more 
than 12 years of imprisonment.” (Zakon.kz 2017) 
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H5: Institutions (Prosecutors and Judges) Resist against the Expansion 
of Jury Trials by Blocking the Expansion of the Jury Trials or by 
Faking It. 
 
Before discussing the late expansion of jury trials it is important to find out what 
was the attitude of law enforcement agencies and other institutions and parties regarding 
the introduction of jury trials back in the beginning of 2000s in Kazakhstan. Prior to the 
final implementation there have been huge debates among politicians, law enforcement 
agencies, judiciary and advocacy communities, as well as non-governmental 
organizations regarding the structure of jury trials. Generally the representatives of law 
enforcement agencies and judiciary community were calling for the postponing of the 
introduction of jury trials as well as adoption of continental model of jury trials (similar 
to France and Germany, where verdicts and punishments are issued by juries in 
cooperation with judge). Rashid Tusupbekov the General Prosecutor in January, 2005 
was calling for postponing the introduction of jury trials: 
“Although the introduction of jury institution would be the important democratic 
step, I am afraid that parties involved in the trial process are not ready for trials 
with participation of juries. I think that it is better to introduce trials in 2007-
2008 and prior to the implementation it is important to organize the educational 
courses for the ordinary people regarding the jury trials.” (Karavan 2005a) 
 
On the other side advocacy community, human rights organizations and some 
politicians were calling for the classical model (Similar to USA and UK, where juries 
determine the guilt of the person, while judges indicate the measure of punishment). 
According to the Dariga Nazarbayeva the deputy of Majilis parliament in 2005 
the continental model of jury panel would complicate the trial processes:  
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“The Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice want to introduce the continental 
model of jury trials, whereas we the “Asar” Party, the lawyers community and 
non-governmental organizations vote for the classical model of jury trials. I 
believe that classical model of jury trials is the important instrument to control 
the authorities. All the attempts to impose the soviet system of lay assessors or the 
continental type of jury trials can be considered as the weakly concealed desire of 
authorities to resist against the control. In the continental model of jury trials the 
impartiality of judges, juries and consequently issued verdicts are under the 
doubt.” (Karavan 2005b) 
 
Back in 2005, Yevgenii Zhovtis the Head of Kazakhstani bureau of Human 
Rights indicated that prosecutors and judges are lobbying the promotion of continental 
type of jury trials, since it will still allow them to issue the suitable verdicts. 
“The continental type of jury trials professional judge has huge influence on the 
juries. Therefore, it is dangerous to put the judge into the same deliberation room 
with juries. There is no need for the adoption of continental type of jury panel. 
Every ordinary citizen is capable of evaluating the evidences provided by 
investigation and prosecution services without the assistance of judge. Therefore, 
we should go with the classical model of jury trials in Kazakhstan.” (Karavan 
2005a) 
 
Although the National committee regarding the drafting the law on juries lead by 
Maksut Narikbayev was suggesting the classical model, the head of Supreme Court 
Kairat Mami opposed this idea and suggested the draft law of the continental type of jury 
trials, which was eventually adopted in the parliament (Karavan 2005a). So, it can be 
noticed that from the beginning in Kazakhstan the law enforcement agencies and judges 
had the leverage over the other institutions. They found a way to promote and adopt the 
continental type of jury trials, which has been opposed by many lawyers and non-
governmental organizations. This trend has continued till nowadays, as prosecutors and 
judges do not allow the widespread use of jury trials, despite the arguments of lawyers 
that the jurisdiction of jury trials needs to be significantly expanded. 
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In December 2016 in Astana the LPRC, a private think-tank, organized a day-long 
conference, related to the development of jury trials in Kazakhstan. During that event the 
judge of the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan Mr. Krukbayev reported about the expansion 
of the jurisdiction of jury trials in our country. He indicated that, in accordance with the 
President order, four more crimes have been added to the competence of juries. He also 
mentioned that the great success have been achieved in the development of this 
institution. However, the Deputy Director of LPRC Ms. Zinovich disagreed with him:  
during the 9 months of 2016 only 36 crimes have been considered by juries and out of 
this number no cases related with expanded crimes have been decided. Furthermore, 
during my interviews many prosecutors and judges admitted that current jurisdiction of 
jury trial courts remains very limited. According to respondents, there are two main 
reasons for that problem. Firstly, they argue that Kazakhstani society is not yet ready for 
the active participation in trials. The mentality and consciousness of our citizens is not as 
developed as in western countries. Secondly, the expansion of jury trials is associated 
with huge financial costs. In the time of economic crises, government of the country is 
not ready spending huge amount of money on the juries’ salaries.  
After the President’s proposal of 100 concrete steps policies in 2015 the 
jurisdiction of jury trials were only slightly changed. Again, only rare cases have been 
included under the jurisdiction of juries. To put it more simply, “political” crimes (e.g. 
Crimes against peace and human security, Criminal infractions against foundations of 
constitutional order and security of the state) and terrorism, have not been included in the 
list of crimes that can be tried by juries. Most importantly, “popular” crimes such as 
second-degree murder, drug trafficking, crimes against property, corruption, etc. also 
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have not been re-introduced. This clearly shows that in Kazakhstan criminal justice 
agencies made the “fake” expansion of the competence of jury trials. This is because jury 
trials are still can be only used in severe crime cases with some exceptions for 
kidnapping, trafficking of minors and their involvement in criminal activities. It worth 
mentioning that according to statistical data from Pravstat.kz, the percentage of severe 
crimes between 2007 and 2015 constituted only about 1-3% out of all criminal offences. 
The Table 8 below demonstrates all four stages of eligibility of crimes for jury trials over 
ten years period. It should be mentioned that In 3 July 2014 the Criminal code has been 
changed and entered into force from 1 January 2015. Although the numbering of articles 
changed, the type of crimes remained the same. 
Table 8. List of Crimes Eligible for Jury Trials, 2007-2016 
Article Type of Crime Introduction 
stage 
 
 Expansion 
stage 
Limitation 
stage 
 
Fake 
expansion 
1997 
Criminal 
code 
2014 
Criminal 
code 
2007 – 
2009 
 
 2010 - 
2013 
2013 - 
2015 
2016 – 
until 
now 
96 99  Murder  Part 2  Parts 1, 
2 
Part 2 Part 2 
120 120 Rape  
 
N/A  Parts 3, 
4 
Part 4 Part 4 
121 121 Violent acts of 
sexual nature  
N/A  Parts 3, 
4 
Part 4 Part 4 
125 125 Kidnapping 
 
N/A  Part 3 N/A Part 3 
128 128 Human 
trafficking 
 
N/A  Part 4 N/A Part 4 
131 132 Involvement of a 
minor in the 
commission of 
criminal 
infractions 
N/A  Part 5 N/A Part 5 
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133 135 Trafficking of 
minors 
N/A  Part 4 N/A Part 4 
179  192 Brigandage N/A  Part 4 N/A N/A 
181 194 Extortion N/A  Part 4 N/A N/A 
235 262 Creation and 
management of 
organized group, 
criminal 
organization, as 
well as 
participation in 
them 
N/A  Part 3 N/A N/A 
235-1 263 Creation and 
management of 
criminal society, 
as well as 
participation in it 
N/A  Parts 1, 
3, 4, 5 
N/A N/A 
235-2 264 Creation and 
management of 
transnational 
organized group, 
transnational 
criminal 
organization, as 
well as 
participation in 
them 
N/A  Parts 1, 
3 
N/A N/A 
235-3 265 Creation and 
management of 
transnational 
criminal 
society, as well 
as participation 
in it 
N/A  Parts 1, 
2, 3 
N/A N/A 
237 268 Banditry N/A  Parts 1, 
2, 3 
N/A N/A 
238 269 Seizure of 
Buildings, 
Installations, or 
Means of 
Communication 
N/A  Part 3 N/A N/A 
239 270 Hijacking or 
Seizure of an 
Aircraft or Sea 
craft or a 
N/A  Part 3 N/A N/A 
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Railway Rolling 
Stock 
240 271 Piracy N/A  Part 3 N/A N/A 
250 286 Smuggling of 
withdrawn from 
handling of items 
or 
items, handling 
of which is 
restricted 
Part 4  Parts 3, 
4 
Part 4 Part 4 
255 291 Theft or extortion 
of weapons, 
ammunition, 
explosive 
substances and 
explosive devices 
N/A  Part 4 N/A N/A 
259 297 Illegal 
production, 
processing, 
acquisition, 
storage, 
transportation in 
order to sale, 
transfer or sale of 
narcotic drugs, 
psychotropic 
substances, their 
analogues 
N/A  Parts 3, 
4 
 
N/A N/A 
260 298 
 
 
 
Theft or extortion 
of narcotic drugs, 
psychotropic 
substances, their 
analogues 
N/A  Parts 3, 
4 
N/A N/A 
261 299 Inducement to 
use narcotic 
drugs or 
psychotropic 
substances 
N/A  Part 4 
 
N/A N/A 
311 366 Acceptance of a 
bribe 
N/A  Part 5 N/A N/A 
312 367 Giving bribe N/A  Part 5 N/A N/A 
Source: http://adilet.zan.kz 
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In order to visualize the distribution of criminal cases decided by jury trials over 
time, it is worth considering the data presented in the Table 9. So, as  
Table 9. Verdicts That Have Been Issued Regarding Crimes, Which 
Belonged To the Competence of Jury Trials, 2007 – 2016 
Article of 
Criminal Code 
in editions  
Type of Crime Verdicts issued regarding each particular crime in years 
16 
July 
1997 
3 
July 
2014 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
96 99  Murder  36 42 58 115 138 108 98 46 39 33 713 
120 120 Rape  
 
N/A N/A N/A 1 7 7 6 0 1 4 26 
121 121 Violent acts of 
sexual nature  
N/A N/A N/A 4 5 6 0 0 0 10 25 
125 125 Kidnapping 
 
N/A N/A N/A 2 1 0 0 N/A N/A 0 3 
128 128 Human trafficking 
 
N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 
131 132 Involvement of a 
minor in the 
commission of 
criminal infractions 
N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 
133 135 Trafficking of 
minors 
N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 
179 192 Brigandage N/A N/A N/A 13 12 9 2 N/A N/A N/A 36 
181 194 Extortion N/A N/A N/A 5 3 3 4 1* 1* N/A 17 
235 262 Creation and 
management of 
organized group, 
criminal 
organization, as 
well as 
participation in 
them 
N/A N/A N/A 0 0 1 1 N/A N/A N/A 2 
235-
1 
263 Creation and 
management of 
criminal society, as 
well as 
participation in it 
N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 
235-
2 
264 Creation and 
management of 
transnational 
organized group, 
transnational 
criminal 
organization, as 
well as 
participation in 
them 
N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 
235- 265 Creation and 
management of 
N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 
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3 transnational 
criminal 
society, as well as 
participation in it 
237 268 Banditry N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 
238 269 Seizure of 
Buildings, 
Installations, or 
Means of 
Communication 
N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 
239 270 Hijacking or 
Seizure of an 
Aircraft or Sea 
craft or a Railway 
Rolling Stock 
N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 
240 271 Piracy N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 
250 286 Smuggling of 
withdrawn from 
handling of items 
or 
items, handling of 
which is restricted 
0 0 0 14 8 8 9 0 0 0 39 
255 291 Theft or extortion 
of weapons, 
ammunition, 
explosive 
substances and 
explosive devices 
N/A N/A N/A 0 0 1 0 N/A N/A N/A 1 
259 297 Illegal production, 
processing, 
acquisition, 
storage, 
transportation in 
order to sale, 
transfer or sale of 
narcotic drugs, 
psychotropic 
substances, their 
analogues 
N/A N/A N/A 114 123 105 60 4* 1* N/A 407 
260 298 
 
 
 
Theft or extortion 
of narcotic drugs, 
psychotropic 
substances, their 
analogues 
N/A N/A N/A 0 1 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 1 
261 299 Inducement to use 
narcotic drugs or 
psychotropic 
substances 
N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A 0 
311 366 Acceptance of a 
bribe 
N/A N/A N/A 2 1 0 1 N/A N/A N/A 4 
312 367 Giving a bribe N/A N/A N/A 0 1 2 0 N/A N/A N/A 3 
Total: 1 
277 
Sources: http://service.pravstat.kz, Official response from the Committee of Legal 
statistics to the request of author 
 
 
it can be noticed from the Table 9, the most popular crime over the period was the murder 
and drug dealing, which accounted respectively for 713 and 407 criminal cases. Other 
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types of crimes rarely happen according to the data. It is interesting to note that there 
have no crimes been committed regarding the new added articles (Kidnapping, human 
trafficking, involvement of minors in the commission of criminal infractions, trafficking of 
minors) into the jurisdiction of jury trials in 2016. 
H6: Institutions (Prosecutors and Judges) Resist through the 
Manipulation of Jury Trial Process (e.g. biased selection of jurors, 
restricting the rights of defendant to have a jury trial, falsifying the list 
of questions given to the jurors before deliberation) 
 
To begin with, it was important to define whether in Kazakhstani judicial 
practices defendants are restricted in their rights to have jury trials. I did not find direct 
evidence for that, since the analysis of over 300 protocols of preliminary court hearings 
during the 2010-2015 years demonstrated that judges, in fact inform the defendants about 
the possibility of consideration of their cases by panel of juries. What is more, defendants 
orally inform judges if they do not want the jury trial (this is recorded in the protocols) or 
they write a motion, if they chose to have jury trials. Interviews with advocates also 
indicated that defendants are well informed about the opportunity of jury trials, since 
defense lawyers explain about the potential advantages and drawbacks of jury trials for 
their clients prior to the preliminary hearings.  So, there are no grounds to suppose that 
defendants are discriminated in their rights to have jury trials in Kazakhstani context. 
Instead, I have found that prosecutors and judges manipulate and improperly 
influence jury trials through biased selection of jurors and falsifying the list of questions 
given to the jurors before deliberation. One of the main problems with jury trials in 
Kazakhstan is that judges have capacity to influence on the jury verdicts in the 
deliberation room. For instance, in 2016, in Specialized Interdistrict criminal court of 
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Karaganda region there was a case regarding 17 years old Alexander Belov who was 
accused of repeatedly raping his 13 year old cuisine sister. She got pregnant and hided 
this fact from her parents for some time. During the discussion of verdict in the 
deliberation room, despite the fact that judge was instructing juries to convict Belov, they 
unanimously acquitted the defendant of rape; since they thought that the sexual contact 
was on mutual consent. Judge decided to dismiss the jury panel since they supposedly 
violated the regulations regarding the discussions of verdict, therefore he ordered to call 
new jury panel for consideration of this case from the beginning. Immediately after that 
juries contacted local journalist in order to complain about this situation. According to the 
jury Aigerim Kerinibaeva, judge ordered them to provide positive answers for list of 
questions, which would make the Belov guilty of rape. However, when juries declined to 
follow the order, judge said: “Are you really going to allow the suspect escape the 
punishment?” Another jury Yelena Ivanova complained that the judge did not provide 
any reasonable explanation for the dismissal of panel. What is more, judge from the 
beginning of trial was ordering juries to not consider seriously the arguments of defense 
counsel. Also she indicated that juries only discussed the verdict among themselves, they 
have not been contacted by other parties nor they contacted any persons outside the 
deliberation room. After that incident, the administrative court of Karaganda issued fines 
in regards to two juries, who participated in Belov’s trial, since they broke the court 
regulations. 
Another illustration of the judges’ interference into the decision-making of juries 
is the case regarding the followers of Sufism in Kazakhstan in 2011, when 9 persons have 
been convicted for long terms including the Professor Ibrayev from the Kazakh National 
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University. The defense attorney of Ibrayev, Abzal Kuspanov indicated that after the 
verdict has been issued, the one jury approached the wife of the Ibrayev and told her that 
from the beginning of the trial he believed that Ibrayev would be acquitted. However, 
under the influence of the judge he was forced to change his opinion. Jury complained 
about the stress, insomnia and with the tears in the eyes asked for the forgiveness. Also, 
Kuspanov with other defense attorneys in this particular case have become the witnesses 
of how the Head of the Almaty Interdistrict Criminal Court Butbai Mamytov prior to the 
issuing verdict many times invited juries to his cabinet and spend with them long hours 
there. According to the advocate, there was no need for inviting juries to the judge’s 
personal cabinet, since there was a separate deliberation room as well as the separate 
official process of determining the verdict. But, judge chose to speak to juries in private. 
Consequently, defense attorneys complained about these violations to the Head of 
Supreme Court, however they did not get the response (Toguzbayev 2011). 
Another example of judge’s influence on jury decision-making comes from the 
criminal case handled by the Specialized Interdistrict criminal court of Aktobe region. 
The juries considered the case regarding Bakhyt Muldagarin who was accused of raping 
5-year-old girl. Eventually, the defendant was convicted to 17 years of imprisonment. 
However, two juries Anastasiya Klesova and Ainur Kurmantaeva revealed that they have 
been forced to convict the non-guilty person. According to the juries, judge Gul’zhan 
Azhigalieva in the deliberation room asked juries to convict the defendant, while the 
Head of the court Nurlan Sultanov also visited the deliberation room and informed juries 
that he had familiarized himself with the case and that he is confident that the defendant 
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is guilty of committing crime. However, when the journalists approached the criminal 
court, they refused to provide comments regarding this particular case.  
Another controversial case was described during my interview with the Astana-
based attorney Amanzhol Mukhamedyarov who currently represents the interests of 
Aidyn Alpysbayev. According to the advocate back in 2015, Alpysbayev the officer of 
National Security Committee (KNB) and his two accomplices Khasenov and Logvinenko 
were found guilty of preparation and failure to commit a murder of businessman Kudin 
and sentenced respectively for 14, 13 and 12 years of imprisonment.  According to the 
verdict, Alpysbayev asked Khasenov to find a person to kill the Kudin in order to seize 
his business of exploration and mining of natural resources. For that purpose the convict 
Alpysbayev provided 10 000$ for the Khasenov. The latter recruited Logvinenko and 
gave him 5,000$ in order to kill Kudin. Logvinenko made three shots to Kudin; however 
the latter found a way to escape from the killer. All the convicts have been captured by 
police during their second attempt of murdering Kudin. During the trial the defense 
counsel many times submitted petitions to rearrange the medical and ballistic 
examinations, however all these petitions have been declined by the judge. After the 
guilty verdict had been handed down, 6 out of 10 presiding jurors appealed to the 
Military court (i.e. all cases regarding employees of law enforcement agencies are 
considered in the Military Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan) about the pressure and 
influence that they experienced from the judge. According to their complaints judge 
forced them to rewrite their answers to the list of questions, until they produced guilty 
verdict. The extractions from the jurors’ complaints are provided below (The copies of 
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complaints have been provided to me by attorney Mukhamedyarov. Translation is my 
own.) 
 
Complaint 1 
In the deliberation room, to all the posed questions regarding the crime I answered that 
Alpysbayev, Khasenov and Logvinenko are not guilty in the proposed allegations. During 
the several days we have been considering this case in the deliberation room. After we 
have answered all the questions and submitted them to Judge, he told us that we need to 
rewrite the answer sheets. Some of jurors under the instruction of judge have rewritten 
their answer sheets. Among jurors there have been old woman, who expressed her 
disagreement about repeated filling of the answer sheets, there have been tough 
conversation between this woman and the judge, after which we have continued voting 
and submitted our answer sheets again.  
 
As far as this particular case is considered, I still believe that the guilt of the suspects has 
not been proven, on top of that during the trials there have been specific questions posed 
to experts regarding the bullets entry and exit holes on the clothes of the victim. 
However, there have been sense that the experts see the clothes of the victim for the first 
time and they could not provide the answers for the questions. Also, during the trials 
prosecutors failed to answer many questions from the defense side. 
 
Complaint 2 
For about three months we have been participating in court trials and obviously the 
eventual verdict did upset us. There have been some discrepancies in this case, for 
instance: there was no gun found of supposed murder attempt, then experts have been 
confused when explaining evidences regarding the bullets holes on the clothes of the 
victim. We [jurors] also had questions, for instance: how it is proved that the records 
made in the notebook of Alpysbayev have been really written by him? For what purposes 
such educated and experienced person like Alpysbayev wanted someone’s business? 
Why, the victim Kudin, if he really was injured did not call the emergency services, but 
called his friend? Why the doctor did not know the type of victim’s injury (doctor said 
that he did not untie the bandage in order to not bring the infection to the injury)? Why 
the victim Kudin said that he has some connections in the Ministry of Interior Affairs, 
whom he consulted, but then denied these connections? Why the surgeon doctor did not 
appear in the court? Why the prosecutor and judge did not pay attention for these issues? 
 
During the voting, there were moments, when we were rewriting our answers. Since 
judge told us that if we answer YES to one question, we could not provide the NO answer 
for the following one. Also, judge told us that if we vote for guilty verdict, then 
Alpysbayev would receive the minimum sentence, because judge would apply the 
minimum punishment according to the new Criminal code. I personally think that the 
guilt of Alpysbayev has not been fully proven. I hope for the just verdict.  
 
 95 
 
Complaint 3 
In the deliberation room we have been given 60 questions regarding the episodes of 
which Alpysbayev has been accused. For the first 10 questions, I responded “NO, not 
guilty” similar to other 10 jurors. After we submitted our answer sheets, we went home. 
After the 10-15 minutes, the judge’s assistant called me and informed that we need come 
back and continue the session. In the deliberation room the Judge explained that one of 
the jurors supposedly contacted over the phone to the one of the defense advocates, that 
is why judge recalled all the jurors again into the deliberation room. Then judge pulled 
out the answer sheets, which we have submitted to him and started to tear them apart. He 
said that we need to answer questions again, consequently he commented the answers of 
each jury and pressured us towards the producing of guilty verdict. 
 
In the deliberation room, I expressed my own opinion. I said that the President 
Nazarbayev on the Congress of Judges announced that we should not deteriorate the 
wellbeing of our citizens, if we want to join the 30 most developed countries in the world. 
After my comments, the judge responded me with the anger “Now everyone shut up!” In 
the aftermath I sit quietly and did not speak at all.  
 
From my point of view, the suspects Alpysbayev, Khasenov and Logvinenko are not guilty 
in committing the crimes, for which they have received harsh punishments. After this trial 
process, I could not find myself, I was shocked, and I hoped that all the suspects would be 
acquitted, since I believed that they did not commit these crimes. I think that their 
involvement in this crime has not been proven. I ask you to investigate this case and take 
all the lawful measures. 
 
Complaint 4 
During the trial process, I was really suspicious regarding the guilt of Alpysbayev, 
Khasenov and Logvinenko. Were there any real attempts to commit a murder? There are 
several reasons for my doubts. 
 
First of all, during the interrogation of the victim Kudin, he indicated that after the failed 
assassination attempt, although he was wounded by three bullet shots he did not call the 
emergency or police, but instead called his assistant. Then, he was waiting his assistant 
at home, after the assistant arrived, Kudin personally drove the car to the hospital. 
Taking into the consideration the fact that any small injuries or wounds of criminal 
character should be reported to the police, it is unclear why the doctor did not inform the 
police about Kudin’s wounds, and why he send the Kudin back to home? 
 
Secondly, during the interrogation the surgeon doctor Tashetov, who inspected the Kudin 
indicated that wounds of Kudin have not been from the bullet shots, since there have not 
been bullet entry and exit holes on the body. As for the report about bullet shots wounds, 
the doctor said that he wrote it according to the words of the victim. Doctor said that he 
cannot confirm that wounds are really from bullet shots, since it is in competence of other 
special experts. However, it was unclear why the expert Andreyev has not been 
interrogated in the trial? Also, why the prosecutors did not bring him to the trial? 
 
 96 
 
Thirdly, I doubted the bullet sleeves that have been found on the place of crime. Two 
sleeves did not contain the smell of powder. The third sleeve found on the next day of 
attempted murder contained the powder smell. However, the smell actually should be 
gone after one day. 
 
Fourth, the gun which has been supposedly thrown by Logvinenko to the river Akbulak 
has not been found by the investigation services. However the flow of the river is not fast 
and it is not so deep. Also, Logvinenko demonstrated approximate place where he thrown 
the gun.  
 
Fifth, the only witness which heard the bullet shots and who is the neighbor of the victim 
Kudin has not been interrogated on trial process. Also, the witness which has been 
mentioned by Logvinenko has not been found and interrogated. 
 
I think that there has not been any attempt made to murder Kudin, thus the guilt of the 
suspects has not been proven. In the deliberation room I expressed my doubts regarding 
the facts related to this crime. However, I was stopped by the Judge who shouted at me  
“Do not set opinion for other jurors!” Also the answer sheets which we filled and 
submitted to the judge have been torn apart and we have rewritten our answers. 
 
Taking everything into consideration, I still believe that the guilt of the suspects 
Alpysbayev, Khasanov and Logvinenko has not been proven, what is more I doubt 
whether there has been the murder attempt.  
 
Complaint 5 
During the trial process I had some doubts regarding the guilt of the Alpysbayev, so 
when we answered first 10 questions and submitted them to the judge, he expressed his 
dissatisfaction. He said that: “the group of qualified specialists have investigated this 
case and made a great work, while you want to nullify all the collected evidences. What if 
this crime has been committed against you or your relatives, would you still acquit the 
defendants?” Then judge suggested us to repeat the voting process and he has torn apart 
our previous answer sheets.  
 
Some of jurors expressed their doubts regarding the guilt of the suspects. However there 
was a harsh reaction from the judge, who said: “Sit and shut up”, also he mentioned that 
jurors should not influence on the opinions of others during the voting. During the 
deliberation process, I asked judge is it possible to see again the bloodied t-shirt of the 
victim Kudin, which has been on the video tape, since I have doubts regarding the tracks 
of blood on the t-shirt. But judge responded that evidences have been destroyed. 
 
I think that the guilt of the suspects have not been proven, that is why I expressed my 
opinion during the voting. 
 
Complaint 6 
From the beginning in the deliberation room the Judge took the accusation position. He 
was reading the questions and when majority of us answered that suspect is not guilty he 
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torn apart the answer sheets and thrown them into the bin. The he distributed new answer 
sheets and said that “anyway the suspects would be convicted, look how big is the 
criminal dossier” This is continued for two days, until we voted how he desired, which is 
the guilty verdict. 
 
Some of jurors tried to oppose the judge, that is why he shouted at them: “why are you 
defending the suspects, why don’t you believe the victim, investigation and prosecution? 
Especially he shouted at the old woman, she tried to defend her opinion that the guilt of 
the suspects is not proven, and judge shouted at her loudly and did not allow her to 
speak. 
 
Overall, in this trial process for me many things have remained unclear. Particularly, 
how victim Kudin after he was shot three times managed to wait his assistant and drive 
the car personally to the hospital. Kudin said that after the shooting he was bleeding 
badly. All his clothes including the trousers and boots were in blood. However, 
prosecutors did not provide these clothes, there has been only t-shirt with little traces of 
blood, on top of that on the interior cover of the car there have not traces of blood been 
found. The whole trial process was very doubtful, the prosecution side and the victim 
himself could not explain properly the provided evidences. 
 
I think that the guilt of Alpysbayev and others has not been proved, therefore I believe 
that they are not guilty, therefore in the answer sheet I voted that they are not guilty. 
 
In the cassation court did not rule in favor of these complaints from jurors because 
according to the law, only parties (i.e. defense or victim side) can appeal the verdict, 
while jurors do not belong to either sides. Nevertheless, in March 2017, the conviction of 
Alpysbayev was overturned by the appellate court due to the fact that the victim 
businessman revealed that he provided false testimonies, the deputy chairman of Astana 
city’s criminal police Suleimenov was found guilty of torturing the Alpysbayev, while 
the forensic expert was found guilty of falsifying the evidence. All these violations led to 
the overturning of the initial guilty verdict, and new court trial in this case was appointed 
on April 12, 2017.  
Furthermore, one of interviewed jurors described to me the trial in which three 
persons were accused of organizing criminal group, sexually violating and killing a man. 
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The juror described how during the whole trial she could not decide whether the suspect 
was guilty or not. However during the discussion of verdict in the deliberation room, the 
judge has revealed some facts about the defendant and his real motives behind the crime. 
This information has had a strong influence on the minds of the jurors and they convicted 
defendants for 19, 15 and 14 years of imprisonment.  
So, it can be noticed that juries expose the weakness of investigation and 
prosecution offices because they require the high quality evidences. Also, it is evident 
that judges influence and pressure the juries.  
Another method of manipulation is the use of legal definitions when constructing 
the list of questions for juries in deliberation room. By using this method, judges may 
confuse jurors and direct them to provide suitable answers. My analysis of more than 300 
criminal trials decided by juries demonstrated the widespread use of legal terms in the list 
of questions. 
Another example of the influence of the judge on jury decision-making is the case 
regarding judges of Supreme Court Dzhakishev and Tashenova who were accused of 
corruption and were convicted respectively for 12 and 10 years of imprisonment. The 
internal audit revealed that the presiding judge has changed the initial list of questions 
and also ordered one juror to fill in the answer sheet for all of jurors. As a result the 
appellate court of Akmola region has overturned the decision made by jury court. 
Interestingly, jurors made a joint complaint with the signatures of 8 people to the 
Supreme Court of Kazakhstan, where they condemned the cancellation of their decision: 
“In the adversarial court procedure, we, jurors tried to be objective and 
impartial. We knew what kind of responsibility we burden, that is why we are 
curious why our decision has been overturned? What kind of violations have we 
done, in order our verdict to be cancelled? The overturning of the decisions 
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imposes the negative image on the juries. We have made the right and just 
decision; the corruption crime of the former judges of the Supreme Court has 
been proven. Each of us made this decision individually. Also, we want to 
underline that we have not experienced any pressure either from the judge or 
from prosecutor. The Republic of Kazakhstan is the rule-of-law state. Nobody has 
the right to break the laws. It does not matter whether the violator is minister, 
ordinary worker or the judge, if they break the law, then all should burden the 
responsibility for the committed crimes. It is very frightening when the servants of 
Themis violate the laws and escape the punishments. We hope that talks about the 
corporate solidarity among judges are only gossips” (Novaya gazeta 2013) 
 
At the first glance, it seems that jurors tried to defend their decision and 
demonstrate their civic positions. However, the defense lawyer Almira Shaikhina who 
participated in this trial told me that this complaint has been driven by the Judge 
Baimagambetov who had presided with the jury in this case. He did not want his decision 
to be overturned on appeal, therefore he persuaded jurors to write a complaint to the 
Supreme Court. Also, the Shaikhina argued that the complaint was professionally written 
and that she doubted jurors’ capabilities of writing such a professionally written 
complaint.  
Moreover, according to the law (Article 662 of the CPRK 2014) the jury verdicts 
can be only overturned in case of procedural violations of court trials. Interviews with 
judges, prosecutors and advocates demonstrated that jury verdicts are usually more 
difficult to overturn than verdicts issued by single judge. According to my respondents, 
verdicts issued by jury courts have more legitimacy compared to single judge verdicts. 
This is because verdicts in jury trials are result of the analysis of 10 jurors and 1 
professional judge, which makes the sentence more solid than sentences of judge-only 
trials. Also, since jury trials occur on the significant less rate than ordinary trials (0.2-
1.5% out of all criminal cases in last ten years) it attracts the attention from the public, so 
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the criminal justice system wants to demonstrate that decisions of juries are highly 
appreciated and not the subject for interference from authorities. Despite this common 
sense within legal community, there is still disparity in the opinions, as judges and 
prosecutors indicate that all the verdicts of juries are difficult to overturn, while defense 
attorneys point out that only conviction verdicts are difficult to overturn.  
However, court statistics demonstrate that the jury verdicts are often cancelled by 
appellate and cassation courts, which originally supposed to correct the errors made by 
trial judges. The main problem in Kazakhstani case is that jury verdicts are evaluated by 
panel of three professional judges in the appellate or cassation court. As Kovalev (2010) 
suggested, the jury verdicts should be evaluated by separate jury panel in the appellate or 
cassation court, it would make the process of appeals more transparent and impartial. The 
Table 10 provides court statistics regarding the frequency of overturning the jury trials’ 
acquittal verdicts. The statistical data for that kind of information is only available on  
Table 10. Overturning the Jury-Made Acquittals in Kazakhstan, 2012-
2016 
Year Number 
of 
persons 
tried in 
jury 
courts 
Number 
of 
acquitted 
persons 
in jury 
courts 
Overturned acquittal verdicts 
in regard to persons in higher 
courts 
 
Ratio of 
overturned 
acquittal 
jury 
verdicts 
Ratio of 
overall 
overturned 
verdicts in 
criminal 
cases 
Total Appellate Cassation 
2012 379 24 11 5 6 45.8 % 0.7 % 
2013 319 30 14 13 1 46.7 % 0.6 % 
2014 121 3 2 2 0 66.7 % 0.5 % 
2015 61 2 1 1 0 50 % - 
2016 75 8 0 0 0 0 % 0.3 % 
Sources: http://service.pravstat.kz, Official response from the Committee of Legal 
statistics to the request of author 
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decisions starting from 2012. As it can be noticed, on average about half (50%) of jury-
issued acquittals have been overturned between 2012 and 2016. This is enormously high 
proportion compared to overall percentage of overturning the decisions of criminal cases 
that was on average less than 1% in the last five years. So, it is the evidence of 
manipulation with the outcomes of jury trials by higher appellate courts, meaning that 
they may correct “supposed errors’ made by courts of first instances 
It is interesting to note how even some legal representatives acknowledge the fact 
of overturning of juries’ acquittal verdicts. Judge of Aktobe Region Interdistrict Criminal 
Court Sisenova (2015) publicly admitted this tendency: 
“There is a tendency of overturning the acquittal verdicts issued by jury courts 
for the reasons, which are not related with the facts of criminal cases, but due to 
previous convictions or administrative penalties of the close relatives of the 
jurors. However, the conviction verdicts have not been overturned for such 
reasons. One of the main problems of the jury selection process is the existence of 
close relatives of jurors, who have been convicted or arrested about which the 
jurors chose to not mention either deliberately or accidently. Actually, according 
to the law these circumstances do not prevent the citizens from the participation 
in jury trials, if they reveal them publicly during the jury selection process.”  
 
If the prosecution side is not satisfied with the jurors’ verdict, then they start to 
investigate jurors, whether they have mental disorders or drug addictions; on top 
of that they inspect all the close relatives of the jurors in order to find out whether 
any of them have had previous convictions. In case of finding these indicators, the 
issued verdict is overturned due to possible influence of the hidden facts (i.e. 
previous conviction of relatives, drug addiction or mental disorder of juror) on 
the decision-making of jurors. Usually, prosecutors do not provide any 
explanation how the irregularities in the background of one jury can influence on 
the decision making of the whole jury panel.”(Sisenova 2015) 
 
Furthermore after analyzing the judicial verdicts, which I have collected through 
the online services of Sudebnyi Cabinet and Paragraph I identified the cases where the 
acquittal verdicts of juries have been overturned. The Table 11 presents my findings. 
There are many examples when defendants have been acquitted, however after certain 
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period their verdicts have been overturned by appellate or cassation court and then they 
have been convicted to prison terms. For instance, there was a case with Mayor of 
Zhanaozen town, who was tried in court regarding the December 2011 violent protests of 
oil workers. Initially the jury court of Mangystau region has acquitted him of corruption 
allegations, however this decision has been overturned and new jury panel in Aktobe 
region has convicted him for 12 years of imprisonment. Another example is the case of 
the human rights activist Vadim Kuramshin, he was also initially acquitted by jury panel 
of extortion allegations, however this verdict has been overturned by appellate court and 
the new jury panel found him guilty and convicted for 9 years of imprisonment. Many 
other examples are presented in the Table 11. So, there is clear tendency that law 
enforcement agencies can manipulate the jury trial by overturning the acquittal verdicts 
on appeal. 
Table 11. List of Cases Found in the PARAGRAPH and Sudebnyi 
Cabinet Databases, in Which the Jury Acquittal Verdicts Have Been 
Overturned, 2010-2013 
N Name of the 
defendant 
Court, 
Year 
Initial verdict Appellate 
Review 
Final verdict 
1 1) Bekov 
Akhmed 
2) Asambayeva 
Aigul 
Astana, 
2010 
1) Convicted to 
11 years of 
imprisonment 
2) Acquitted 
1) The verdict 
in regards to 
Bekov 
Akhmed is 
remained 
without 
changes. 
 2) The 
verdict in 
regards to 
Asambayeva 
Aigul has 
been 
Asambayeva 
Aigul is 
convicted to 10 
years of 
imprisonment 
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overturned 
2 Batalov Yerlan Astana, 
2012 
Convicted to 2 
years of 
imprisonment 
The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
Convicted to 10 
years of 
imprisonment 
3 1) Madiev Rasul 
2) Adayev 
Alshynbek 
3) Kabylbayev 
Ruslan 
Akmola 
region, 
2013 
1) Convicted to 
12  
years of 
imprisonment 
2) Acquitted 
3) Acquitted 
 
 
1) The verdict 
in regards to 
Madiev Rasul 
is remained 
without 
changes. 
The verdicts 
regarding 
Adayev 
Alshynbek 
and 
Kabylbayev 
Ruslan have 
been 
overturned 
Adayev 
Alshynbek is 
convicted to 9 
years of 
imprisonment 
Kabylbayev 
Ruslan is 
convicted to 9 
years of 
imprisonment 
4 Bakirov Dmitrii Atyrau 
region, 
2010 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
The new 
verdict is 
closed for 
public access 
5 Berezin Pavel East 
Kazakhstan 
region, 
2010 
Acquitted  The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
Convicted to 13 
years of 
imprisonment 
6 Kondratyev Petr East 
Kazakhstan 
region, 
2012 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
Convicted to 16 
years of 
imprisonment 
7 Simonovich Igor Zhambyl 
Region, 
2010 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
The new 
verdict is 
closed for 
public access 
8 Kuramshin 
Vadim 
Zhambyl 
region, 
2012 
Convicted to 1 
year of 
imprisonment, 
released in the 
courtroom after 
the verdict 
The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
Convicted to 12 
years of 
imprisonment 
9 Sarbopeev Orak Mangistau 
region, 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
Convicted to 10 
years of 
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2012 overturned imprisonment 
10 Khaidarov 
Anuarbek 
North 
Kazakhstan 
region, 
2013 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
The new 
verdict is 
closed for 
public access 
11 Zhumanov 
Torebek 
South 
Kazakhstan 
region, 
2010 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
Convicted to 15 
years of 
imprisonment 
12 Shakurov Rashid South 
Kazakhstan, 
2010 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
The new 
verdict is 
closed for 
public access 
13 Safronov Sergei Pavlodar 
region, 
2013 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
Convicted to 3 
years of 
imprisonment 
14 Slepakov Oleg Pavlodar 
region, 
2011 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
Acquitted 
15 Mashkhoev 
Ruslan  
Pavlodar 
region 2012 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
Convicted to 10 
years of 
imprisonment 
16 Zaicev Vladimir Pavlodar 
region, 
2011 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
The new 
verdict is 
closed for 
public access 
17 1) Narymbayev 
Tolybai 
2) 
Dzhumageldinov 
Zhumagalii 
Pavlodar 
region, 
2011 
1) Acquitted 
2) Acquitted 
The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
1) Convicted to 
12 years of 
imprisonment 
2) Convicted to 
12 years of 
imprisonment 
18 Abildin 
Amangeldy 
Pavlodar 
region, 
2012 
Acquitted The verdict 
has been 
overturned 
In new trial 
prosecutor has 
partially 
removed some 
accusations and 
the case in 
regards to 
suspect has 
been ceased 
due to act of 
Amnesty  
Sources: https://prg.kz, http://office.sud.kz 
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Conclusion 
 
This work contributes to the greater framework of studies that investigate the role 
of judicial politics in non-democracies. Generally, scholars indicate that authoritarian 
rulers maintain tight control over the judiciary systems in their countries (e.g. Moustafa 
2007; Rajah 2012; Peerenboom 2002). Autocrats use laws in order to legitimize their 
power and use criminal justice system in order to punish their opponents. In this context, 
the example of Kazakhstan is indeed represents the paradoxical case. Since, authorities 
“transplanted” the foreign democratic jury institution into the punitive and highly 
controlled Kazakhstani legal system. Consequently, this study demonstrates the 
controversies in politics of jury trials in Kazakhstan at all stages of its development. The 
jurisdiction of jury trials experienced the significant changes during the whole period of 
its existence. This is because, although authorities were pushing for the improvement and 
expansion of jury trials in the state, judicial and law enforcement communities have been 
resistant to implement these developments into practice. The content analysis of public 
speeches of legal officials as well as interviews with judges and prosecutors demonstrated 
that the resistance against the expansion of jury trials in Kazakhstan is not 
straightforward. Although the majority of legal community is against the expansion of 
jury trials in Kazakhstan, there is still a minority group who supports the jury institution 
and calls for the reforms in order to improve this institution and expand its jurisdiction.  
Furthermore, as I demonstrated in my work the juries enable to discipline judges 
and prosecutors, thus make the process of trials more adversarial. Most importantly, this 
study contributes to the field of legal consciousness of jurors – in the Kazakhstani 
context, despite the influences and manipulations from judges; the ordinary people can 
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decide serious criminal cases. Jurors intolerant towards being controlled by judges and 
they expose the weaknesses of prosecution and investigation services in providing 
reliable evidences. Also, jurors are against the harsh criminal punishments for certain 
crimes. On top of that, jurors are not restricted within the framework of the criminal 
charges proposed by prosecutor, they can and actually do change the qualification of 
alleged crimes toward less severe ones, which consequently lessen punishment.  
The Kazakhstani criminal justice system is characterized by strong accusation 
bias, the authorities have the control over the judiciary, which allows them the 
prosecution and punishment of the political opponents. That is why, the development of 
the jury trials in Kazakhstan is indeed a very complicated reform. This is because it has 
not only legal but also the political character. The controversy of jury trials is the fact that 
the state shares its power of administration of justice with the representatives of ordinary 
people. It goes without saying that the process of transmission of the right for criminal 
repression from authorities to ordinary citizens cannot be straightforward.  
In my work, I tried to find out whether the jury trials reduce the accusation 
bias in the Kazakhstani legal practices? The answer to this question is Yes and No. 
This is because, relying upon statistics it is clear that in jury trials the acquittal rates are 
on average twenty five times higher than in ordinary trials. Also, interviews with all the 
parties of trial processes as well as the juries themselves enabled me to identify, why they 
acquit on a higher rate than single judges. The primary reason for the acquittals is the 
weak evidential base provided by investigation and prosecution services. Juries in most 
cases simply cannot accept the obvious violations made by investigation services or 
absence of decent proof of the guilt of the defendant. Instead of rubber-stamping 
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decisions of police operatives, as professional judges often do, jurors really decide 
criminal cases. Another reason for more frequent acquittals is absence of fear in jurors 
regarding the overturning of their decision by appellate and cassation courts. In ordinary 
trials judges do care more about the survival of their verdicts on appeal, while juries do 
not have such an attitude. Even though the influence of the presiding judge in the 
deliberation room is strong, juries acquit on a higher rate than single judges do. Thus, 
jurors deciding criminal cases together reduce the pro-accusation bias.  
However, the impact of juries’ decisions on the overall criminal justice system is 
very weak. This is because the criminal cases tried by jury constituted merely between 
0.2 and 0.5% of all criminal cases heard since 2009. Even when we include their 
acquittals, the total acquittal rates in Kazakhstani criminal justice never exceeded 0.5%. 
Therefore, although jury trials produce higher acquittal verdicts compared to the ordinary 
trials, their effect on the criminal justice system is almost invisible. For that reason I 
argue that jury trials in their contemporary form and jurisdiction do not reduce the pro-
accusation bias in the overall Kazakhstani legal practices. Why is that happening? The 
jury trials do not have the proper effect on the reduction of accusation bias in the criminal 
justice system due to the resistance from legal institutions, which do not want the 
expansion of the jurisdiction of the jury trials in Kazakhstan.  
This leads us to the second research question considered in my study: how and 
why legal institutions resist against the expansion of jury trials in Kazakhstan? In 
general, legal institutions such as prosecution, investigation and judicial offices resist 
against the expansion of jury trials in Kazakhstan, since judges do not want to share their 
power in deciding criminal cases with ordinary people, while prosecution and 
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investigation services do not want to expose their weaknesses in collecting reliable 
evidences and proves of the guilt of the defendants. The interested groups within legal 
institutions have already succeeded in their resistance back in 2005, when they have 
promoted the draft law of the continental model of jury trials in Kazakhstan, as opposed 
to American model that was suggested at the time by advocacy community and some 
members of parliament. The adoption of the continental model of jury trials in 
Kazakhstan allowed saving the practice of the informal relationships between the judges 
and prosecutors as well as the judges of first and appellate instances, this is because juries 
cannot break or influence these relationships. The inclusion of the judge into the panel of 
10 jurors in the deliberation room, provides opportunities for a judge to determine the 
verdict. Therefore, the informal bargaining between the judges and prosecutors as well as 
the judges of first and appellate instances still exists.  
How do criminal justice agencies resist against the expansion of jury trials in 
Kazakhstan? Generally, the resistance is divided into the two levels: top level – by 
limiting or making fake expansions of the jurisdiction of the jury trials through the 
legislature, lower level – by influencing the decisions of the juries in the deliberation 
room and overturning the acquittal verdicts of juries in the appellate courts. As it has 
been demonstrated in my investigation, the legal institutions have limited the category of 
criminal cases that are available for juries’ consideration back in 2013 and made a fake 
expansion of the jurisdiction of jury trials in 2016 by adding 5 criminal cases, which 
happen extremely rarely. Another example of resistance is the influence and pressure that 
judges impose on juries during the discussion of the verdicts in the deliberation room. 
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Also, institutions resist by overturning the acquittal verdicts of juries, the scale of this 
practice is indeed huge.  
Taking everything into consideration, the legal institutions do not want to share 
power with ordinary people in the judiciary because jury trial courts impose only burdens 
and risks on the criminal justice professionals without offering any benefits. The same is 
true of the provincial governments responsible for compiling lists of eligible jurors in 
their provinces. Currently criminal justice system is literally under the control of the 
executive branch. Authorities have a strong capacity to influence and negotiate the 
decision-making of judges in order to obtain the desired verdict for any case, including 
political ones. So, the logical question emerges: Why did Kazakhstan introduce the jury 
trials? While most of prosecutors and judges believe that jury institution was 
implemented in order to democratize the Kazakhstani legal system, the attorneys consider 
the introduction of jury trials as the “window dressing” – the demonstration of state’s 
democratic initiatives to the international audience. If the government truly wants the 
development of jury institution, it should expand its jurisdiction to the appropriate level, 
through adding not particular criminal cases, but whole category of cases such as all 
severe crimes to its jurisdiction. Also, current mixed court model of jury trials 
demonstrated its huge weaknesses, since judges have the full capacity to influence on the 
decision-making of jurors. That is why, it is more relevant to switch to the classical jury 
model, where jurors determine the verdicts separately from the judge, and judge only 
considers the measure of punishment. Nevertheless, the Kazakhstan is considerably 
young country, currently it is going through the state of institutional modernizations. 
Therefore, there is a hope that in near future there would be more reforms conducted 
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regarding the institution of juries and it will eventually reach the standards of western 
developed countries.  
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